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I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1970s private commercial banks dramatically ex-
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panded their international lending operations.' A significant percentage
of these loans were made to sovereign borrowers, particularly to the
less developed countries of Latin America.' By the mid-1980s loans to
non-oil-exporting developing countries3 (NODCs) comprised a signifi-
cant percentage of many commercial banks' loan portfolios. In 1982,
for example, the nine largest U.S. banks held NODC loans totalling
10.6 percent of their total assets and 222 percent of their total capital."
During the 1970s these loans had been extremely profitable, and for
many U.S. banks in this period international loans accounted for half
or more of annual earnings. 5 By 1979, however, the culminating effects
of policy errors, rising oil prices, world-wide recession, declining prices
for NODC exports, and high interest rates made it increasingly diffi-
cult for many NODCs to service their external debt.' As a result, many
NODCs faced default and began rescheduling negotiations with the
banks.
7
This "debt crisis" produced a flood of popular 8 and academic9
1. Reisner, Default by Foreign Sovereign Debtors: An Introductory Perspective
1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 2, 1-2 (between 1970 and 1981 international loans by U.S. banks
increased from 50 billion dollars to over 400 billion dollars).
2. Approximate Latin American Indebtedness in 1985
(billions of dollars)
Country Total Debt Public Sector Private Sector
Brazil 100.0 62.0 38.0
Mexico 94.0 76.0 18.0
Argentina 43.5 29.6 13.9
Venezuela 34.0 28.0 6.0
Chile 21.0 7.0 14.0
Peru 12.4 10.5 1.9
Colombia 10.5 6.7 3.7
Bolivia 5.3 3.8 1.5
Ecuador 6.8 5.2 1.6
Uruguay 4.6 5.3 1.3
Eskridge, Les Jeux Soun Faits: Structural Origins of the International Debt Problem,
25 VA. J. INT'L L. 281, 282 n.2 (1985).
3. The less developed countries (LDCs) whose debt problems are particularly
acute are primarily non-oil-exporting less developed countries (NODCs). Id. at 282.
4. Staff of Senate Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy of Senate Foreign Re-
lations Comm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess., International Debt, the Banks, and U.S. Foreign
Policy (Comm. Print 1977).
5. Reisner, supra note 1, at 4.
6. See infra notes 21-52 and accompanying text.
7. In 1983 alone, 30 NODCs completed or were engaged in debt renegotiations.
See 13 IMF SURVEY 178 (June 18, 1984).
8. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1984, §3, at 1; Wash. Post, Aug. 29, 1984, at
D8; N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1982, at DI, col. 6.
9. See, e.g.,T. ENDERS & R. MATTIONE, LATIN AMERICA: THE CRISIS OF DEBT
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literature and government studies."0 Interestingly enough, however, it
has produced remarkably little litigation." Commercial banks have
been extremely reluctant to declare a NODC in default, and instead
have almost uniformly agreed to restructure their loans.'"
This willingness of the banks to restructure rather than litigate
over a default is curious, but can be explained through an application
of games theory to the problem. A variant of the classic games theory
prisoner's dilemma, termed the creditors' dilemma, demonstrates that
although creditors have strong incentives to begin collection action
against a defaulting debtor rather than to renegotiate, such action pro-
duces the worst collective result.'3
In domestic debtor-creditor relations, U.S. bankruptcy law pro-
vides an efficient escape from the creditors' dilemma. 4 In the interna-
tional lending system, the NODC creditors' dilemma has thus far been
avoided through a combination of economic incentives and powerful ad
hoc political pressures; a costly and uncertain procedure that has
AND GROWTh (1984); A DANCE ALONG THE PRECIPICE, (W. Eskridge ed. 1985);
Brock, Trade and Debt: The Vital Linkage, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 1037 (1984); Eskridge,
supra note 2; Kuczynski, Latin American Debt, 61 FOREIGN AFF. 344 (1982); Roett,
Democracy and Debt in South America: A Continent's Dilemma, 67 FOREIGN AFF.
695 (1984); Symposium: International Lending: The Case for Developing Nations,
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 551 (1974); Symposium: Default by Foreign Government
Debtors, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; Solomon, Developing Nations and Commercial Banks:
The New Dependency, 12 J. INT'L L. & EcON. 325 (1978).
10. See, e.g., International Monetary Fund, Survey of Multilateral Debt Renego-
tiations Undertaken within the Framework of Creditor Clubs, I.M.F. Doc. No. Sm/
80/174 (1980) [hereinafter cited as IMF Renegotiation Survey]; Staff of Senate Sub-
comm. on Foreign Economic Policy of Senate Foreign Relations Comm., supra, note 4;
UNCTAD, Selected Issues Related to the Establishment of Common Norms in Future
Debt Renegotiations, U.N. Doc. TD/AC.2/9 (1977).
11. The only significant exceptions are Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito
Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Allied
Bank], affd, No. 83-7714 slip op. (2d Cir. Apr. 23, 1984) (per curiam) [hereinafter
cited as Allied Bank I, reprinted in the Appendix immediately following this article],
rev'd on rehearing, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Allied Bank II]
and Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco National de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) both of which arose out of the Costa Rican moratorium on foreign debt pay-
ments in 1981.
The Costa Rican decisions failed to resolve many of the important issues involved
in NODC debt litigation. Nevertheless the controversy is a useful case study of the role
of comity in NODC debt litigation. "The story of Costa Rica's rescheduling may one
day become a case study for banking schools." Step By Step Through the Costa Rican
Saga, EUROMONEY, Aug. 1982, at 33 [hereinafter cited as Step by Step].
12. IMF Renegotiation Survey, supra note 10, at 4.
13. See infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
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worked in the short-term but is unsatisfactory as a long-term solution
to a problem that is likely to reoccur. 5 A less costly and more certain
method of avoiding the creditors' dilemma is urgently needed.
Unlike a domestic U.S. debtor who may resort to formal bank-
ruptcy procedures upon default, a NODC facing default has no analo-
gous procedure available for the initiation of renegotiations. The
NODC must signal its difficulty to its creditors by promulgation of a
debt moratorium temporarily suspending payment of its obligations to
private lenders and requesting prompt renegotiation of its external
debt. Adoption of a moratorium usually constitutes an event of default,
and the resulting nonpayment is always a default. Should the NODC's
creditors attempt to collect on the loans through litigation in U.S.
courts, the NODC may plead the moratorium as a defense under the
act of state or comity doctrines. Under current U.S. law neither doc-
trine necessarily protects a NODC from enforcement of its loans.16
This article argues that giving effect to a debt moratorium through
comity is the only effective method of avoiding the creditors' dilemma
and the resulting financial disaster that would befall both the NODC
and its creditors if each creditor pursued an individual course of action.
Moreover, the article argues that the NODC's creditors would - in
the absence of the dilemma - agree ex ante to give effect to a morato-
rium. Of course, this does not mean that all moratoria should be en-
forced. A moratorium which is either repudiatory in effect or treats
some creditors preferentially would not be acceptable to commercial
banks, nor would it be consistent with U.S. policy.1 7 A test to deter-
mine when to give effect to a debt moratorium is therefore necessary,
since not all moratoria will meet the standards required by comity."6
Courts have had difficulty giving content to the comity doctrine
because there are few clear guidelines as to when courts should give
effect to foreign law. 19 This article proposes that sections 304 and 305
of the United States Bankruptcy Code"0 provide a test by analogy for
the recognition of foreign debt moratorium laws. Part II briefly traces
the origin of the NODC debt problems. Part III examines the debt
restructuring process and applies the creditors' dilemma to NODC
debt. Part IV sets forth a policy rationale and a test for granting com-
ity to debt moratoria and uses the Costa Rica restructuring as a case
15. See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
16. See Allied Bank H, 757 F.2d 516; see also, infra notes 129, 171 and accom-
panying text.
17. See infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 120-32 and accompanying text.
20. 11 U.S.C. §§304-05 (1982).
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study of its operation.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOVEREIGN DEBT PROBLEM
Although a variety of explanations for the NODC debt crisis have
been advanced,21 the most commonly accepted theory seems to be the
"external shocks" hypothesis.2 Under this view, the world-wide reces-
sion, high interest rates, declining prices for NODC exports, and espe-
cially the rapid rise in oil prices were the principal reasons for the
shortage of currency and the debt crisis in the NODCs in the early
1980s. These external "shocks," however, are not fully explanatory.
Similar effects were felt during the recession and oil price increases of
1973-74 but without the number of near defaults of 1979-82. Some
additional factor is therefore necessary to explain the current crisis.
A growing body of evidence suggests that both the NODCs and
their creditors made serious errors in responding to the external shocks
of the 1970s and that these errors were at least as important in induc-
ing the crisis as these shocks themselves .2 The most important of the
external shocks under this analysis was the dramatic increases in oil
prices in both 1973 and 1979. In 1973 oil imports made up six percent
of the value of total NODC imports, but by 1980 they constituted
twenty percent of the total.24 After adjusting for inflation, the NODCs
paid out an additional 260 billion dollars to finance the rising cost of oil
imports.2  As a result, they faced substantial trade deficits.2
The NODCs could have responded to the problem in a variety of
ways, by either curtailing non-oil-imports, adopting austere fiscal and
monetary policies, increasing exports, encouraging additional foreign
investment, or borrowing from foreign lenders. Although some NODCs
chose a combination of the above responses in an attempt to address
the underlying balance of payments problem, many NODCs - partic-
ularly the Latin American nations - relied principally on external bor-
rowing from commercial lenders.2" As a result, even allowing for infla-
21. See generally, Eskridge, supra note 2.
22. See, e.g., id. at 281; Tapia, Mexico's Debt Restructuring: The Evolving Solu-
tion, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 3-4 (1984); Note, Procedural Guidelines for Re-
negotiating LDC Debt: An Analogy to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Reform Act,
21 VA. J. INT'L L. 305, 316-20 (1981).
23. W. CLINE, INTERNATIONAL DEBT: SYSTEMATIC RISK AND POLICY RESPONSE 8
(1984).
24. Id. at 9.
25. Id. at 10.
26. Between 1973 and 1981 the total NODC deficit increased from 11 billion to
108 billion dollars. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 289.
27. Eskridge discusses the unhappy consequences of the NODCs' increase in bor-
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tion, NODC external debt more than doubled, 8 as they paid their oil
debts with borrowed dollars.
Historically, short-term balance of payment deficits had been fi-
nanced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 9 The NODCs,
however, were both unable and unwilling to obtain IMF financing of
their oil imports, for several reasons. In comparison both to NODC
needs and the amount of funds available from private creditors, the
IMF's lending ability was minimal.3 0 Moreover, the IMF requires bor-
rowers to accept significant supervision of their economic policies. This
"conditionality" ' is intended to assure that the debt will be repaid and
that the borrower will adopt economic policies intended generally to
promote financial recovery and specifically to alleviate the underlying
problems creating the balance of payments deficit.32 Many NODCs
were unwilling to accept rigorous IMF supervision and therefore looked
instead to commercial lenders for their needs .
3
Ironically, the same oil price increases that initially sent the
NODCs to the banks permitted and, in fact, encouraged the banks to
make these loans. The rapid price rise gave the oil exporting countries
sizable current account surpluses. Most of these "petrodollars" were
deposited with the major banks in the United States and Western Eu-
rope. At the same time, the demand for credit in the developed states
rowing from foreign lenders during this period. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 288-94; see
also Note, supra note 22, at 318-20.
28. Without discounting for inflation, NODC debt "nearly quintupled between
1973 and 1982, increasing at an average annual rate of 19%." Eskridge, supra note 2,
at 289.
29. See Robichek, The International Monetary Fund: An Arbiter in the Debt Re-
structuring Process, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 143 (1984); Note, supra note 22, at
309-13.
30. Note, supra note 22, at 311 n.33.
31. "The word conditionality refers ... to the policies that the Fund [IMF]
wishes to see a member follow in order that it can use the Fund's resources in accor-
dance with the purposes and provisions of the Articles [of Agreement of the IMF]." J.
GOLD, CONDITIONALITY 2 (1979). For example, "[u]nder Article V, Section 3(a) of
the original Articles, one condition on which a member was entitled to make purchases
was that 'the member desiring to purchase' the currency represents that it is presently
needed for making, in that currency, payments which are consistent with the provisions
of this agreement." Id. at 3.
32. To accomplish these goals the IMF "imposes conditionality in all public policy
areas that are relevant to a country's balance of payments performance." Robichek,
supra note 29, at 149.
33. "[M]ember countries also have delayed coming to the IMF for help with
framing of adjustment programs and for its financial support of such programs while
foreign banks continued to finance them liberally, and turned to the IMF only when
the banks cut off further credit." Id. at 148.
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in which the banks operated was relatively low.3 4 Moreover, the banks
imposed only minimal conditions on their loans.36 Thus, the banks and
the NODCs were a natural match for each other. The banks had sur-
plus petrodollars which they wanted to lend and which the NODCs
desperately wanted to borrow. The NODCs made the initial misjudg-
ments that aggravated the crisis. They believed that their balance of
payments deficits were temporary and that painful long-term solutions
to their problems were therefore unnecessary. The large, low real inter-
est rate loans offered by the banks provided an attractive short-term
solution to what was thought to be a short-term problem. 6 Within the
NODCs themselves, the economic actors displayed little or no aware-
ness of the dangers that balance of payments deficits pose to developing
states. Enterprises grew accustomed to borrowing abroad, the elites
continued their high level of import consumption, state enterprises and
projects had insufficient incentives to economize, and the current ac-
count deficit increased each year. All this fueled additional borrowing.
As a result, the payments deficits were no longer temporary, and the
imbalance between exports and debts continued to grow.37
The banks also made serious errors of judgment. The pressure on
the banks to put their enormous petrodollar deposits to profitable use
caused many of them to make large loans to NODCs with minimal
investigation or research. 38 Many banks actually encouraged such
34. Note, supra note 22, at 315-16. The recession in the United States and other
developed nations in the mid-1970s was the primary cause of reduced borrowing de-
mand. Schirano, A Banker's Point of View, in A DANCE ALONG THE PRECIPICE 19
(W. Eskridge, ed. 1985). For a review of this book, see infra at page 167.
35. The private banks' focus differs sharply from that of the IMF. Rather than
focusing on the impact of loan repayment on the economy of the borrower, the private
banks focus on the ability of the NODC to technically comply with the loan agree-
ment's terms. Robichek, supra note 29, at 149.
36. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 293.
37. The oil price increases and interest rate rises of the late 1970s were the pri-
mary factors in converting the balance of payments crisis from short-term to long-term.
The amount of dollars needed by NODCs for importing oil and servicing debt in-
creased dramatically as a result. The increases simultaneously cut demand for NODC
exports, plunging the balance of trade ever deeper. Id. at 294-96.
38. "It may be that ... supply-side pressures were even more important than
demand side pressures in explaining why so many lent so much to [NODCs]. One
recent account describes the leading international bankers as 'traveling salesmen' or
'hucksters' [who lent millions] based on little more than telexes describing the deals."
Eskridge, supra note 2, at 292. This process was known as receptionist banking. "When
you went out to lunch, you could have told the receptionist to watch the telex and take
$5 million of any deal." D. DELAMIDE, DEBT SHOCK: THE FULL STORY OF THE WORLD
CREDIT CRisis 44-45 (1985).
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loans.39 This lack of attention to "country risk""' probably resulted
from the banks' assumption that "countries don't go broke, ' 41 but un-
fortunately the banks greatly underestimated the likelihood that the
NODCs would be unable to repay the loans.
The banks' emphasis on sovereign lending increased the percent-
age of their assets that were at risk in NODCs. The huge portfolios of
NODC loans held by the major banks"3 violated the fundamental in-
vestment principle of portfolio diversification .4 By late 1983, loans to
the major NODCs represented such a large percentage of the banks'
assets that a default by any single state would have put several banks
39. D. DELAMIDE, supra note 38, at 43-45; Eskridge, supra note 2, at 293. Profes-
sor Lowenfeld makes the following observation with regard to major U.S. banks: "I
gained the impression that the way for ambitious persons to move up the ladder in a
major money-center bank was to make loans, and that the bigger the loan, the faster it
was approved." Lowenfeld, Foreward: International Debt Crisis Symposium, 17
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 485, 486 (1985).
40. "Even though the creditworthiness of a particular foreign borrower may have
been established to the bank's satisfaction, events may occur that could prevent the
borrower from meeting its obligations under the terms of the loan. For example, the
economy of the country in which the borrower is located may take a sudden turn for
the worse ... [the country may experience] a balance of payments emergency ... [or]
violent political upheavals .... " Walter, Country Risk and International Lending,
1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 71-72.
41. One noted banker describes the prevailing philosophy at the major banks this
way: "Walter Wriston, the powerful head of Citicorp in the 1970s, told us that foreign
sovereign loans were safe (look at the record), make us all rich, and they made Ci-
tibank (Citicorp's main enterprise) the largest bank in the United States. He also hired
Irving Friedman, who made a lasting impression on international finance when he said:
'Countries don't go broke!'" Schirano, supra note 34, at 18.
42. See supra text accompanying note 4. Note the following exposures of the ma-
jor U.S. banks:
Millions of Dollars in Loans
Loans as Percent of
Bank Argentina Brazil Mexico Venezuela Capital
Citicorp 1090 4700 2900 1500 154.3
Bank America 300 2484 2741 1614 116.7
Mfg'rs Hanover 1321 2130 1915 1084 200.3
Chase Manhattan 755 2560 1553 1226 136.5
J.P. Morgan 741 1785 1174 464 102.9
Chemical 370 1276 1414 776 136.0
Bankers Trust 230 743 1286 436 119.4
Continental Ill. 401 476 699 436 83.9
reprinted in Eskridge, supra note 2, n.293, citing The Latin American Times, Apr. 16,
1984 (No. 58) at 8.
43. The banks failed to spread their risks widely to minimize large potential
losses. See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 293.
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in serious jeopardy of being unable to meet their cash flow require-
ments.44 The problem was further exacerbated by the similar condi-
tions confronting the NODCs; if one state defaulted more would likely
follow."5 The banks had therefore also become a prisoner of the crisis.
As a result, the NODCs and the banks were exceptionally vulnera-
ble to the second wave of external shocks in 1979-82. Any economic
setback was likely to push an NODC over the brink into default. In
1982 the banks awoke to the problem, responding by substantially cur-
tailing new loans to the NODCs.4 With the underlying problems un-
resolved, the resulting loss of external funds for the NODCs meant that
they were unable to finance their current account deficits.4 Even
before the highly publicized Mexican Crisis in August 1982,41 most of
the Latin American NODCs were unable to make their scheduled debt
payments, triggering a wave of renegotiations. 49 According to Professor
Eskridge, a pattern of "external shocks, failure to cope, resultant infla-
tion and (sometimes) capital flight; drying up of new bank credit; con-
fession of inability to service debts, [and] a rescue package by the
IMF, the banks, and (sometimes) the U.S. government," 50 occurred
44. "Had any one of [Brazil, Mexico or Argentina] defaulted, the bank's share-
holders would have lost much of their investment, and several banks might have be-
come insolvent themselves." Id.
45. From a risk perspective, separate NODCs would face default as a result of
similar external shocks. Professor Walter explains: "To be reducible risk [of a country
defaulting] must be unsystematic; [that is] the economic and political futures of the
countries in which the bank is exposed must be substantially independent. Certain
events, however, have worldwide impact. If, for example, OPEC doubles oil prices or
global interest rates rise, numerous countries simultaneously may suffer economic trou-
bles." Walter, supra note 40, at 73.
46. Commercial bank sovereign lending fell by 23 billion dollars in 1982. Es-
kridge, supra note 2, at 302 n.52. The banks moved in a more positive direction by
forming the Institute of International Finance. The Institute, comprising 189 private
commercial banks from 39 countries holding over 80 percent of private NODC loans, is
intended to provide better country risk information to banks and to act as a liaison
between the banks and NODCs. Surrey & Nash, Bankers Look Beyond the Debt Cri-
sis: The Institute of International Finance, Inc., 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 111
(1984).
47. The underlying problems are discussed supra notes 37, 38 and accompanying
text.
48. On the Mexican debt crisis see Gibbs, A Regional Bank's Perspective: An
Analysis of the Differences and Similarities in the U.S. Banking Community's Ap-
proach to and Participation in the Mexican Restructuring, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 11 (1984); Tapia, supra note 22. Although Mexico, as an oil exporter, is not a
NODC, it confronts problems similar to those facing NODCs.
49. Professor Eskridge discusses the renegotiations of Mexico, Argentina and Bra-
zil in Eskridge, supra note 2, at 303-07.
50. Id. at 306 n.69.
1986]
10 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 10
throughout the region.
The world-wide economic recovery and the generally successful re-
negotiation process have alleviated the crisis considerably." However,
the underlying problems remain and several commentators have sug-
gested that the crisis may recur.52 Obviously, the legal issues raised by
NODC debt moratoria remain of great importance.
III. RENEGOTIATION VS. LITIGATION
A. The Restructuring Process
Renegotiation of a NODC's debt involves a large number of play-
ers, each with differing agendas and incentives. Among the important
potential participants are the NODC and its legal and financial advi-
sors,5 3 the commercial banks and their advisors," the IMF and govern-
ments of the developed nations ("the official creditors"). 55
The crucial first step in most debt restructurings is an agreement
between the NODC and the IMF. Official creditors will not participate
in renegotiations until such an agreement has been concluded.56 Gener-
ally, the commercial banks also require the conclusion of an agreement
between the IMF and the NODC prior to opening negotiations with
the NODC.5 7 The price the NODC must therefore pay for debt relief
51. Surrey & Nash note that the primary factors in the big three debtor nations
easing the crisis were: twenty percent lower inflation in Mexico from 1982 to 1983;
Brazil's three billion dollar increase in exports during the same period; and Argentina's
emergency bridge financing arrangement with the IMF. The authors caution that prob-
lem areas remain. Surrey & Nash, supra note 46, at 127-30.
52. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 283, 350-51; Surrey & Nash, supra note 46, at
127-29; Bait. Sun, Mar. 28, 1986, at 30.
53. For a useful perspective on the role of legal and financial advisors to the
NODCs, see Bogdanowicz-Bindert, The Role of Financial Advisors in the Bank Debt
Reschedulings, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 49 (1984); Hurlock, Advising Sovereign
Clients on the Renegotiation of Their External Indebtedness, 23 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 29 (1984).
54. See generally, Mudge, Sovereign Debt Restructure: A Perspective of Counsel
to Agent Banks, Bank Advisory Groups and Servicing Banks, 23 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 59 (1984).
55. The IMF's role is detailed in Robichek, supra note 29, at 146-53; Note, supra
note 22, at 320-28; Santucci, Sovereign Debt Resolution Through the International
Monetary Fund: an Alternative to the Allied Bank Decision, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 1 (1985).
The developed nation creditor governments typically act through "creditor clubs,"
the best known of which is the Paris Club. See Rieffel, The Paris Club, 1978-1983, 23
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 83 (1984); see also, Hurlock, supra note 53, at 38.
56. Rieffel, supra note 55, at 86.
57. Hurlock, supra note 53, at 37. Although the commercial banks have occasion-
ally restructured NODC debts without an IMF agreement, those renegotiations were
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is acceptance of IMF conditionality."
Once the NODC reaches agreement with the IMF, it often will
seek additional relief from the official creditors themselves. Negotia-
tions are conducted through a creditor's club, usually the Paris Club.59
The Paris Club has no fixed membership and is open to any official
creditor. It is more an ad hoc procedure for restructuring negotiations
than it is an institution, reflecting the official creditors' view that rene-
gotiation is an extraordinary step and not a normal transaction." Al-
though Paris Club negotiations and decisions are conducted by the
creditors themselves, 61 the IMF continues to play an important role as
an advisor.62 Successful negotiations are concluded with an "Agreed
Minute" constituting the terms of the debt relief agreement between
the Club and the NODC.es The Minute is then implemented by bilat-
eral agreements between the NODC and each member of the Club (or
their financial agencies). 4 Debt relief through the Paris Club can take
a variety of forms: restructuring payment schedules of existing loans,
extension of new credit,66 and/or guarantees of commercial loans.66
The final stage of a full restructuring is renegotiation of the
NODC's commercial loans.6 These negotiations are complex, normally
involving upwards of several hundred commercial banks.6 The large
exceptional. Rieffel, supra note 55, at 87.
58. The NODCs have objected to this requirement, but to no avail. See Note,
supra note 22, at 322-23; see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 55. In a few cases the NODCs have used direct bilateral nego-
tiations with official creditors rather than the creditor club process. Hurlock, supra note
53, at 38. The most important example is probably the Nicaraguan restructuring,
where "several major creditors (notably the United States) blocked any discussion of
specific rescheduling terms and no Paris Club agreement was signed." Rieffel, supra
note 55, at 86 n.12.
60. Rieffel, supra note 55, at 91-92.
61. Id. Rieffel discusses Paris Club procedures at 90-98.
62. See id. at 93-97; Note, supra note 22, at 321-22.
63. Typical clauses in a Paris Club Minute are set out in Rieffel, supra note 55, at
99-106.
64. Id. at 106.
65. Id. at 100.
66. The involvement of debtor governments in planning heightens the focus on
long-term objectives of the debtor countries. See Hurlock, supra note 53, at 38; Note,
supra note 22, at 328.
67. The order of negotiation is not necessarily fixed. As noted, supra text accom-
panying note 57, negotiations with the commercial banks have sometimes preceded
IMF discussions. However, the typical restructuring proceeds on the order in the text.
See Hurlock, supra note 53, at 37-38; see also Note, supra, note 22, at 323-28
(describing the Zaire and Peru restructurings: Zaire followed the IMF, Paris Club,
commercial bank pattern; Peru initially did not, but finally did).
68. The number of banks involved in the Mexican restructuring was approxi-
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number of banks involved naturally prohibits effective bargaining, so
ad hoc steering committees or advisory groups are usually created to
represent the commercial creditors.6 9 Increasingly, the IMF again plays
an important advisory and mediation role in this stage, as well.7 0 As
with official creditor debt relief, commercial loan restructuring agree-
ments typically provide for new credit, and/or modification of the
terms of existing loans. 7' The restructuring agreement worked out by
the NODC and the steering committee becomes effective once the
holders of a specified percentage of the sovereign's obligations have
agreed to participate.72
B. Why Restructure?: The Creditors' Dilemma
Despite the fact that individual collection action could have
yielded more favorable results for some of the creditor banks, the com-
mercial banks were willing as a group to use the restructuring process
rather than pursue individual collection remedies. This result is ex-
plained by referring to the "creditors' dilemma". As Eskridge has ob-
served, the NODC debt crisis is a classic example of the "prisoner's
dilemma."173 The prisoner's dilemma is a games theory construct deal-
ing with the clash between individual and collective behavior in an at-
tempt to reach the optimal result. In its classic explanation, two bur-
glars working together are arrested and charged with theft. The
prosecutor offers a deal to both defendants: "If you plead guilty and
testify, and the other does not, you will get off and your partner will get
mately 180. Gibbs, supra note 48, at 11. The comparatively small Costa Rica renegoti-
ation involved 170 banks. Brief of Defendants - Appellees on Rehearing at 14-15,
Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985)
[hereinafter cited as Defendant's Rehearing Brief].
69. Mudge, supra note 54, at 64-65. This role may also be filled by the agent
banks of the various loan syndicates involved; see also Clarke & Farmer, Rights and
Duties of Managing and Agent Banks in Syndicated Loans to Government Borrowers,
1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 229, 242-44, 246-47.
70. Robichek, supra note 29, at 146-50.
71. Mudge, supra note 54, at 71.
72. The percentage of the sovereign's external debt that must be included is usu-
ally quite high. The Costa Rican agreement "required the holders of at least 98% of
the Costa Rican external commercial bank debt to agree to participate before the re-
structuring could become effective." Defendant's Rehearing Brief, supra note 68, at 15
n.17.
73. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 346. The prisoner's dilemma is a classic concept in
games theory. See generally, R. LuCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIoNS, 94-102
(1957); A. RAPOPORT & A. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (1965); J. WILLIAMS,
THE COMPLEAT STRATEGIST (1966) (a useful lay introduction to games theory with a
number of applications to legal analysis); see also C. GOETZ, LAW AND ECONOMICS 8-
20, 400, 414 (1984).
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five years in prison. If you both testify then you will both get three
years, but if you do not testify and your partner does you get the five
years and your partner goes free." What the prosecutor does not tell
them is that if they both remain silent they can only be convicted of a
lesser offense carrying a nine month sentence.7 4 In this case, the opti-
mum collective behavior is for both defendants to remain silent, but the
individual optimum is for the defendant to testify. If the defendant tes-
tifies, the worst he can receive is a three year sentence, while if he
remains silent he may receive five years. Unless the defendant's partner
can be trusted or convinced to also remain silent, the defendant's incen-
tive is to testify so as to minimize his potential loss. Games theory
therefore predicts that both defendants will testify, producing the worst
collective result (see figure 1).7" The prisoner's dilemma illustrates that
individual optimizing behavior, in the absence of cooperation, produces
the worst collective result.
FIGURE 1
The Prisoner's Dilemma
Joint Result in Parenthesis
.o Prisoner #1's Behavior
SILENCE TESTIFY
oSILENCE -0.75, -0.75 -5, 0
(-1.5) (-5)
TESTIFY 0, 5 -3, -3
(-5) (-6)
0
Prisoner's dilemmas are common in debtor-creditor relationships.
For example, assume a debtor (D) borrows $50,000 from each of two
creditors (Cl and C2, respectively). 76 Further assume that the debtor
has $60,000 in assets available in the event of default, and that individ-
ual collection remedies would cost each creditor $2,000. Upon default,
if Cl and C2 act cooperatively and split the available assets equally,
each will get $30,000 by choosing to liquidate damages immediately
(assuming that acting cooperatively is costless). 77 If Cl and C2 choose
to cooperate by reorganizing rather than liquidating, both of them will
74. The "deal" is laid out in full detail in C. GOETZ, supra note 73, at 8-9.
75. Id. at 13-14.
76. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bar-
gains, 91 YALE L. J. 857, 862 (1982). This example and the following analysis is taken
from Professor Jackson at 861-68.
77. Even if cooperative behavior is not costless, it will still be the joint optimum as
long as it is less costly than individual behavior in the aggregate.
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eventually be paid in full. If, however, both creditors pursue individual
remedies, the first creditor to obtain a lien will collect the full $50,000
owed him (although it will only be worth $48,000 because of the
$2,000 collection cost), but the second creditor will collect only $10,000
of the $50,000 owed him (worth $8,000). Thus, both CI and C2 have
an incentive to pursue individual collection action, "racing" to obtain
the first lien and thereby assure full recovery, even though that behav-
ior produces the worst collective result (see figure 2).
FIGURE 2
The Creditors' Dilemma
Joint Result in Parenthesis
Assumes that the cooperative action is
reorganization and that Creditor #2 is
first to obtain a lien when both litigate
o Creditor #1's Behavior
COOPERATE LITIGATE
m COOPERATE 50000, 50000 8000, 48000
(100000) (56000)
LITIGATE 48000, 8000 48000, 8000
(56000) (56000)
I-
The creditors could have agreed, prior to the default, that they
would act cooperatively in the event of a default. Such an agreement
would provide for an equitable repayment of principal and interest. In
order to assure that no individual creditor will take independent collec-
tion action (thereby reducing the pool of assets the debtor may use to
reorganize), the creditors would also agree to a freeze on all individual
litigation. However, in an economy with many debtors, and new credi-
tors arising with each transaction, bargaining costs of an ex ante agree-
ment would be prohibitive.78 The costs of policing such an agreement
would also be high.7 9 Thus, in a complex economy, no cooperative
78. Jackson, supra note 76, at 866.
79. For a discussion of monitoring and bonding problems in the similar context of
relational contracts, see Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1089 (1981). Freeriding may occur whenever it is necessary to extract contribu-
tions from a group of individuals in order to carry out collective goals. The Freerider
assumes that he need not contribute since others will contribute enough to carry out the
transaction, conferring a benefit on those who do not participate, as well as those who
do. If a sufficient number of group members so reason, the transaction will not occur.
See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, PROPERTY 55 (1981). Ex post agreements are similarly
unlikely. The first creditor to obtain a lien has no incentive to join a cooperative solu-
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agreement will be reached and the creditors' dilemma will still result in
the worst outcome.
In domestic debtor-creditor relationships U.S. bankruptcy law pro-
vides an escape from the creditors' dilemma "by making available a
mandatory collective system after insolvency has occurred." 0 The mere
presence of such a system means that the optimal collective result will
be achieved even if the creditors make no conscious effort to agree with
each other.8"
The NODC debt crisis is an excellent real world example of the
creditors' dilemma. Many of the smaller private creditors could have
recovered their defaulted loans from attachable NODC assets. Thus,
they had strong incentives to pursue individual collection action. Fur-
ther, there is no system comparable to U.S. bankruptcy law for dealing
with NODC debt problems."' Existing legal rules create virtually no
barriers to pursuit of individual action. Most NODC loan agreements
actually encourage individual action with elaborate acceleration and
cross-default clauses, permitting creditors to accelerate their loans and
tion and so must be bought out at full cost. If many creditors are involved, freeriding
problems would make buying out the lien creditor virtually impossible. Jackson, supra
note 76, at 865.
80. Jackson, supra note 76, at 867. The Bankruptcy Code's method of achieving
this result is discussed infra at notes 160-68 and accompanying text.
81. The presence of a bankruptcy system does not mandate its use. The realiza-
tion that a creditor could always initiate the bankruptcy process would deter at-
tempts in any non-bankruptcy collective proceeding to provide any creditor with
less than the minimum obtainable in a bankruptcy proceeding. The availability of
a mandatory collective system in which distributions are governed by a set of stat-
utory rules is, therefore, important because it stipulates a minimum set of entitle-
ments for claimants that, in turn, provides a framework for implementing a con-
sensual collective proceeding outside of the bankruptcy process. One would
normally expect to see consensual deals among creditors outside of the bankruptcy
process attempted first, at least to the extent that there are potential cost savings
in remaining outside of the formal bankruptcy process, since those savings could
be consensually allocated. The formal bankruptcy process would presumably be
used only when individualistic "advantage-taking" in the setting of multi-party
negotiations makes a consensual deal too costly to strike - which may occur fre-
quently as the number of creditors increases.
But because the bankruptcy rules set the stage against which consensual col-
lective proceedings will be negotiated outside of bankruptcy, it is important that
those rules be drawn in a fashion that is likely to minimize incentives for ineffi-
cient recourse to a collective proceeding.
Jackson, supra note 76, at 867.
82. Although formal restructuring plans have been proposed by some commenta-
tors, the NODC debt renegotiation remains ad hoc and noninstitutional. See Note,
supra note 22, at 328-38, which suggests an institutionalized procedure based on an
analogy to U.S. Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11 reorganizations.
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pursue collection action upon event of default to any single creditor. 3
Jurisdiction in a collection suit initiated by a creditor against a
NODC or its agencies in a U.S. court is almost never difficult to estab-
lish. It is determined by reference to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA). 84 Though the FSIA grants foreign states85 immunity from
suit in U.S. courts, it does so subject to several specified exceptions.8 "
Where an exception applies to deny immunity, the FSIA grants U.S.
district courts both personal and subject matter jurisdiction." The most
important exception in cases of NODC debt litigation is section
1605(a)(1), which provides that if a foreign state "has waived its im-
munity either explicitly or by implication" it is no longer immune to
suit.8 8 Because such waivers are standard in loan agreements, the
waiver exception will usually be available to NODC creditors.8 9
83. Hurlock, supra note 53, at 40-41. The right to initiate collection action does
no good if it cannot be enforced, but there are currently no significant legal restraints
on enforcement of NODC loans. See generally, Ryan, Defaults and Remedies Under
International Bank Loan Agreements with Foreign Sovereign Borrowers - A New
York Lawyer's Perspective, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 89.
84. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§1330, 1332(a)(4), 1391(g), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1982)).
85. "[D]efined to include the State, its political subdivisions, and its agencies and
instrumentalities." 28 U.S.C. §1603(a) (1982).
86. Id. §§1605-07.
87. Id. §1330. See also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,
489 (1983). Combining immunity, personal jurisdiction, and subject matter jurisdiction
into a single test - if the foreign state is not immune, both forms of jurisdiction are
established automatically - has been criticized as "[an oddity (if not an idiocy)."
Smith, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: A Plea for Drastic Surgery,
1980 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 49, 50-69 (1981).
88. 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(1).
89. Eskridge, supra note 2, at 344. A typical waiver agreement is contained in
Ryan, supra note 83, at 113 n.l 11. Even if the loan agreement does not contain an
express waiver clause, a finding that the NODC implicitly waived its immunity or that
the loan was a commercial activity will also give rise to jurisdiction (28 U.S.C.
§1605(a)). Ryan notes that a finding of implied waiver is a question of fact that is
strictly construed in favor of the foreign state and therefore is an uncertain basis for
jurisdiction. Ryan, supra note 83, at 112-13. A commercial activity is "either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act" (28
U.S.C. §1603(d)). The foreign state is denied immunity with regard to any claim aris-
ing out of a commercial act having substantial contact with the United States (28
U.S.C. §§1603(e), 1605(a)(2)). Although the legislative history of the FSIA clearly
indicates that sovereign borrowing was considered a commercial activity, there is some
uncertainty as to when NODC loans would have sufficient contacts with the United
States for immunity to be denied. (H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1976); Eskridge, supra note 2, at 345 n.183; Ryan, supra note 83, at 114 n.120.)
Nevertheless, there will probably be few cases in which sovereign immunity is not de-
nied a defaulting NODC under one of the exceptions. Under the Libra Bank Ltd. v.
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Given the absence of mandatory restructuring procedures and the
presence of readily available collection procedures the creditors' di-
lemma predicts that the banks would select individual rather than col-
lective action. 0 Nevertheless, the collective optimum - restructuring
- was uniformly achieved. 91 The banks avoided the creditors' dilemma
because the official creditors and the IMF both recognized the urgency
of the problem." The private creditors also came to realize that a coop-
erative solution was in their interests."
The major banks had powerful incentives to cooperate in avoiding
the creditors' dilemma. Most NODCs had few assets that could be at-
tached in U.S. collection proceedings." Moreover, a NODC with insuf-
ficient foreign currency to meet even its debt-service obligations is un-
likely to have sufficient funds to satisfy a sizable judgment for
Banco National de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), and Allied Bank II
decisions, neither the act of state doctrine nor comity provide the NODC any more
protection than does sovereign immunity. (See infra notes 129, 171 and accompanying
text). Therefore, in most cases, foreign states can be successfully sued under current
law if they default on their loan agreements with commercial banks.
90. See supra notes 76-101 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., de Larosiere, Remarks Before the Institute of Foreign Bankers, 13
IMF SURVEY 145, 146 (1984) ("It was crucial that the [NODC debt] problems be
tackled quickly, in a cooperative manner .... ").
93. "[A] growing realization developed that any workable solution necessitated
broad support and that it was in the vital interest of all parties to cooperate." Id; see
also Hurlock, supra note 53, at 45. ("[S]overeign borrowers and their creditors now
have begun to realize that to a considerable degree their interests converge.")
94. "The inadequacy of a legal remedy for creditors in such a scenario is evident
from the events occurring subsequent to the Libra decision. Although the plaintiffs in
Libra won a judgment against Costa Rican banks, they were unable to attach enough
assets to satisfy the judgment. Eventually, the plaintiff banks voluntarily relinquished
the judgment and acquiesced to the Costa Rican renegotiations." Although the out-
standing balance in Libra exceeded $30 million, plaintiffs succeeded in attaching only
$800,000 from Costa Rican bank accounts in New York City. There is evidence that
Costa Rica removed at least $2.5 million from U.S. bank accounts in order to avoid
attachment. Comment, Renegotiation of External Debt: The Allied Bank Cases and
the Chapter 11 Analogy, 17 MIAMI INTER-AMER. L. REV. 59, 75 (1984).
"The modern restrictive theory of immunity gives foreign states greater protection
against losing their assets through attachment than against being sued. Under the
FSIA, only the 'property in the United States' can be attached if the judgment is
against the country itself or its departments or subdivisions (28 U.S.C. §160(a)
(1982)). Moreover, unless there is a waiver of attachment immunity, the property at-
tached would have to be that 'used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is
based,' namely the loans. (Id. §1610(a)(2)). The funds held by the state's central bank
for its own account are expressly immunized by the FSIA. (Id. §1611(b)(1))." Es-
kridge, supra note 2, at 346.
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default. 95 Individual action by the major banks could have only re-
sulted in a full default by the NODCs and probable insolvency for
some of the major banks and substantial losses for the rest. Coopera-
tion was the major banks' only alternative.
The NODCs had strong incentives to cooperate, as well. If a
NODC fully defaulted it would have been excluded from the interna-
tional capital markets that are essential to the well-being of its econ-
omy. NODCs need to maintain essential imports and strengthen their
export industries in order to resolve their underlying balance of pay-
ments problems, while at the same time servicing their existing external
debts. Because their foreign currency flow was then inadequate even to
service their existing debt, NODCs required new sources of capital to
solve their underlying problems and maintain a minimal stapdard of
living. The NODCs dependence on external funds therefore required
that they renegotiate rather than disclaim their obligations.9
All this, however, does not explain the willingness of the smaller
banks also to join the restructuring process. While the major banks felt
compelled to extend new loans to the NODCs (in order to finance im-
plementation of the conditionality process by the NODCs, and because
only if the process succeeded in restoring the NODCs' economies would
the major banks recover their original loans97), the smaller banks could
have chosen to freeride on the major banks and thus refused to partici-
pate." Thus, the NODC would have continued paying the freeriding
banks (or be in default), but the smaller banks would not have ex-
tended risky new loans. Moreover, for some of the smaller banks, the
funds available in the United States could have satisfied a judgment
against the NODC. The smaller banks thus had strong incentives to
pursue individual action. The creditors' dilemma in fact predicts that
they would litigate rather than renegotiate, unless some external factor
forced them to pursue the collective optimum. Fortunately, both the
major banks and the governments of the developed nations recognized
the potential problem posed by the smaller banks. The major banks,
95. But cf. Allied Bank H, 757 F.2d at 522, where the court held "[t]he appellees'
inability to pay United States dollars relates only to the potential enforceability of the
judgment; it does not determine whether judgment should enter."
96. For a discussion of the NODC ideology on this point, see Eskridge, supra note
2, at 348-49.
97. This phenomenon is known as "involuntary lending." For an analysis of this
see W. CLINE, supra note 23, at 71-73.
98. In the Mexican restructuring "the banks with very small exposures were re-
luctant to increase their exposure by a penny even if it meant writing off their existing
portfolios. The banks with medium exposure were equivocal, and within this group
many banks with significant private sector exposure were reluctant to commit more
funds .. . ." Gibbs, supra note 48, at 18.
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national bank regulators in the countries involved and the IMF applied
political and financial pressure on the smaller banks to participate.99
This combination of economic and political incentives resulted in
universal renegotiation of NODC debt. 00 It was, however, an ex-
tremely vulnerable process. The pressures exerted on the smaller banks
were enormous: "from the perspective of a regional bank, 'cram down'
is not an unduly harsh description of what in fact occurred, ... the
experience has been one that few would want to repeat."'0 1
Unfortunately, this entire process entails numerous risks and the
potential for a renewed crisis remains. Unforeseeable future external
shocks - new oil price increases, wars, revolutions, natural disasters,
recessions, or a surge in interest rates - could trigger another crisis.
Fiscal austerity imposed by conditionality could trigger political up-
heaval in the NODCs.10 2 Protectionist trade legislation by the devel-
oped nations, impairing the NODCs' access to export markets and ex-
acerbating their balance of payments deficits, could also induce a
crisis. 03 The new credit extended in the restructuring process further
increases the risk of a new crisis. The new loans bear short maturity
debts and high interest rates. Moreover, by increasing the NODC's
debt to export ratios these new loans decrease the amount of foreign
99. "The combined pressure of the Advisory Bank Group, the IMF and the U.S.
regulating authorities was sufficient to convince the majority of banks to commit." Es-
kridge, supra note 2, at 349. See also Gibbs, supra note 48, at 19; Diaz-Alejandro,
Latin American Debt: I Don't Think We Care in Kansas Anymore, 1984 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 355.
100. Even in the Costa Rican restructuring 170 of the 171 banks involved joined
the restructuring agreement. Only Fidelity Union Trust Company of New Jersey ini-
tially refused to join. Allied Bank II, 757 F.2d at 519.
101. Gibbs, supra note 48, at 23-28. "The Fund has so far been remarkably suc-
cessful in bringing lenders and borrowers together on the appropriate adjustment pro-
grams and in persuading private lenders to produce enough new credit to support them.
The process, however, is constantly vulnerable to the demands of "holdout" or "rogue"
banks, who can always resort to litigation to enforce their creditors' remedies. The size
and number of these recalcitrant lenders might very well increase as the size and num-
ber of debt reschedulings increase. The process is therefore skewed, because the Fund's
powerful leverage over debtor countries via conditionality is not paralleled by any di-
rect authority of the Fund over private lenders. There are reasonable grounds to fear
that the old instruments used by the Fund will not succeed in eliminating the risk of a
system collapse." Santucci, supra note 55, at 33.
102. For a detailed discussion of this possibility, see Roett, supra note 9.
103. Brock, supra note 9, at 1055. "Debtor countries are being encouraged to
devalue their currencies in order to promote exports. The access of their products to
markets in industrialized countries, however, is being hindered by growing protectionist
trends. It is estimated that about one-third of Brazilian exports to the U.S. is affected
by some kind of formal restriction." Amaral, The Debt Crisis from the Point of View
of a Debtor Country, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 633, 637 (1985).
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currency available to address the underlying structural problems."" If
the NODCs must expend their foreign currency reserves on debt ser-
vice rather than on building up their export industries, the balance of
payments deficits will remain unresolved. The pessimism of many com-
mentators therefore seems well taken.10 5
Should a new crisis occur a new round of restructuring may be
necessary. Absent some change in the present renegotiation process the
creditors' dilemma and the incentives of the various parties will remain
unchanged. Thus, the smaller banks must again be subjected to intense
political and economic pressure to join restructurings. Such pressures
are not only risky, because they may not always succeed, but also be-
cause they dramatically increase the costs of renegotiation by increas-
ing the costs of bargaining. 106
In U.S. bankruptcy law the existence of mandatory reorganization
reduces the cost of achieving the collectively optimal result by eliminat-
ing the need for bargaining between creditors.07 The absence of such a
procedure in NODC debt restructuring complicates renegotiation un-
necessarily. Although formal bankruptcy-like procedures in the NODC
context are unlikely and probably impractical,10 8 a more certain
method for compelling restructuring than presently exists is necessary
to reduce the cost of achieving collective behavior. Enforcement of
NODC debt moratoria provides such a method.
IV. DEBT MORATORIA AND COMITY
The creditors' dilemma has important implications for sovereign
debt litigation. It provides both a compelling policy rationale for giving
effect to NODC debt moratoria legislation under the proper circum-
stances and suggests how a court may structure a test to determine
when such moratoria should be given effect.
A. A Policy Basis for Comity in NODC Debt Litigation
A NODC facing default may choose to signal its difficulty to its
creditors by promulgating a debt moratorium. 0 9 Typical moratoria de-
104. Roett, supra note 9, at 697-98.
105. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
106. The continued litigation against Costa Rica in Allied Bank II is an excellent
example of this potential problem. Reduction of bargaining costs is one of the law's
basic purposes. See Note, Trade Usages in International Sales of Goods: An Analysis
of the 1964 and 1980 Sales Conventions, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 619, 650 (1984).
107. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
108. See Ryan, supra note 83, at 128-31.
109. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
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clare that the state and/or its agencies have insufficient foreign cur-
rency or are otherwise unable to make scheduled loan payments. Such
moratoria were declared by a number of troubled NODCs during the
1979-82 crisis. 110 In most cases declaration of moratoria constituted an
event of default,1 ' even if no payments had yet been missed.
In the event of litigation by the banks against a defaulting NODC,
the NODC may raise the debt moratorium legislation as a defense in
the courts of this country under either the act of state doctrine or the
international legal doctrine of comity. Under current law, the act of
state doctrine almost certainly will be inapplicable to NODC debt liti-
gation."' Comity, however, provides an independent rationale for giv-
ing effect to the debt moratorium.
1. Comity
Comity rests upon entirely different policy considerations than
does the act of state doctrine. The act of state doctrine is not a norm of
international law," 3 but rather a domestic rule of judicial abstention
"aris[ing] out of the basic relationships between branches of govern-
ment in a system of separation of powers.""' 4 The doctrine reflects the
constitutional commitment of foreign relations to the Executive and
"the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task
110. See, e.g., Allied Bank II, 757 F.2d at 519 (Costa Rica); Gibbs, supra note
48, at 14-16 (Mexico).
111. But see Ryan, supra note 83, at 97 (noting, however, that some loan agree-
ments "surprisingly" omit a clause specifying a moratorium as an event of default).
112. The act of state doctrine is inapplicable where the situs of the affected prop-
erty is outside the acting state. Tabacalera Severtiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar
Co., 392 F.2d 706, 715 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968). In Allied
Bank 11, 757 F.2d at 521, the court held that "Costa Rica could not wholly extinguish
the Costa Rican banks' obligation to timely pay United States dollars to Allied in New
York." The court reasoned that because the debt was payable in New York, the agent
bank was located in New York, some of the negotiations took place in the United
States, and the United States interests outweighed those of Costa Rica, that "[u]nder
either analysis [act of state doctrine or ordinary situs analysis], the situs of the debt
was in the United States." Id. at 522. Since most NODC loan agreements are struc-
tured similarly, the court's analysis is applicable generally. The court's decision with
regard to the act of state question is at the least debatable, but lies beyond the scope of
this article. For a more detailed discussion of the problem of the application of the act
of state doctrine in cases involving indefinitely situated property, see Note, The Resolu-
tion of Act of State Disputes Involving Indefinitely Situated Property, 25 VA. J. INT'L
L. 901 (1984).
113. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 422 (1964) ("No inter-
national arbitral or judicial decision discovered suggests that international law
prescribes recognition of sovereign acts of foreign governments.").
114. Id. at 423.
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of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather
than further this country's pursuit of goals . . . in the international
sphere." 115 Where applicable, the doctrine therefore requires U.S.
courts to abstain from review of foreign state actions.116
In contrast to the act of state doctrine, comity is a rule of interna-
tional law requiring the court not to abstain from reviewing the foreign
law or decision, but rather affirmatively to give that law effect in the
forum country.1 7 Comity has been defined in a number of ways, but
the definition first given it in Hilton v. Guyot" 8 remains the starting
point of any comity analysis. In Hilton, the Supreme Court defined
comity as
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to
the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, hav-
ing due regard both to international duty and convenience, and
to the rights of its own citizens .... 119
Hilton held that the law of another nation is presumptively valid in the
United States, "unless some special ground," such as "showing that it
115. Id. "The policy concerns underlying the doctrine focus on the pre-eminence
of the political branches, and particularly the executive, in the conduct of foreign pol-
icy." Allied Bank II, 757 F.2d at 520.
116. See First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 769
(1972) ("The act of state doctrine ... is a judicially accepted limitation on the normal
adjudicative processes of the courts . . . ."); International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d
1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982) ("The act of state
doctrine declares that a United States court will not adjudicate ... the sovereign act of
a foreign state."); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977) ("[t]he political act complained of here was clearly within
the act of state doctrine and [therefore] ... is non-justiciable.").
117. As part of customary international law, comity is "part of our law," and, like
any doctrine of customary international law, in the absence of a controlling statute,
treaty, or constitutional provision compelling a different result, it must be given effect.
See The Paguete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). THE RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §135(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, Apr. 1, 1980)
grants comity, as part of customary international law, an even more expansive role: "A
rule of international law ... supersedes any inconsistent law of the several states of the
United States, as well as any inconsistent preexisting provision in the law of the United
States." See also Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), affd on
other grounds sub. nom Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir.
1981). But see Goldklang, Back on Board the Paguete Habana: Resolving the Conflict
Between Statutes and Customary International Law, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 143 (1984).
118. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
119. Id. at 164.
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was affected by fraud or prejudice" ' is established by the party seek-
ing to persuade the court to withhold comity.
Comity "summarizes in a brief word a complex and elusive con-
cept - the degree of deference that a domestic forum must pay to the
act of a foreign government not otherwise binding on the forum."121
The overriding of ordinary choice of law rules to give effect to a foreign
law or decision is based on the "recogni[tion] that comity serves our
international system like the mortar which cements together a brick
house."1 22
Comity is a necessary outgrowth of our international system of
politically independent, socio-economically interdependent na-
tion states. As surely as people, products and problems move
freely among adjoining countries, so national interests cross ter-
ritorial borders. But no nation can expect its laws to reach fur-
ther than its jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate, and enforce.
Every nation must often rely on other countries to help it
achieve its regulatory expectations. Thus, comity compels na-
tional courts to act at all times to increase the international
legal ties that advance the rule of law within and among
nations. 123
Comity is not, of course, completely unbounded. Where giving ef-
fect to the foreign act would be contrary to some fundamental policy of
the forum, comity is not obligatory. Most of the case law governing the
application of comity has emerged from the federal courts and the state
courts of New York. These courts require that the foreign act must be
"fundamentally prejudicial" to "the strong public policies of the fo-
rum" for comity to be refused.1"4 Justice Cardozo, in an early New
York opinion, stated flatly that comity should be granted unless to do
so "would violate some fundamental principal of justice, some prevalent
conception of morals, [or] some deep-rooted tradition of the common
weal."1' 2 5
120. Id. at 205.
121. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
122. Id. at 937.
123. Id. (footnote omitted).
124. Id.; Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 203 N.E.2d 210,
212 (1964) ("[f]oreign-based rights should be enforced unless [to do so] ... would be
the approval of a transaction which is inherently vicious, wicked, or immoral, and
shocking to the prevailing moral sense.").
125. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 244 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918).
Justice Cardozo does not use the term "comity," though his discussion is predicated on
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Judicious application of Justice Cardozo's public policy exception
to the comity doctrine would serve both the United States' policy inter-
ests and those of the international economic system. The Supreme
Court has long recognized that the United States "cannot have trade
and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on
[its] own terms, governed by [its] laws, and resolved in [its] courts."' 26
Yet, many foreign observers and policy makers remain frustrated with
what they perceive as the refusal of U.S. courts to recognize foreign
governmental acts with effects in the United States. This frustration
impedes the efficient functioning of the international economic system
and is fueled by the growing tendency of U.S. courts to assert the pre-
dominance of its laws and policies over individuals and businesses
abroad. Comity, when granted in those cases that legitimately do not
fall within the public policy exception, will aid the efforts of U.S.
courts and policy-makers to assert jurisdiction and enforce judgments
abroad, because foreign lawmakers will be more willing to effectuate
the rulings of U.S. courts if they can rely on U.S. courts to recognize
the validity of foreign laws. Without the cooperation of foreign
lawmakers, U.S. judicial rulings are more difficult to enforce abroad.
Comity is thus an important tool available to U.S. courts in their ef-
forts to assert U.S. law abroad.
Further, comity does not require U.S. courts to abdicate to the
Executive Branch their responsibility to insure that the effects of for-
eign acts meet fundamental principles of justice. Exercise of this re-
sponsibility by the Judicial Branch rather than the Executive will pro-
duce a more consistent and stable standard for foreign acts to meet
than would result from a standard produced by a procession of ideolog-
ically disparate Executive's. This also allows the Executive to deflect
pressures to intervene from sovereign nations.2 8 Such considerations
have already prompted the Supreme Court to reduce the amount of
deference paid to the Executive in applying the act of state doctrine
and other doctrines of international law.' 9
When determining whether foreign acts comport with U.S. public
policy or standards of justice, U.S. courts are rightfully beginning to
conclude that: "International comity is not [solely] reserved for foreign
proceedings that obtain results identical to those under American
the same concept.
126. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
127. Campbell, A Non-U.S. Perspective, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1985, at 28.
128. Id. at 30.
129. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972);
see infra note 204 and accompanying text.
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Law."' 130 Particularly where another state's economic policies are con-
cerned, U.S. courts have consistently recognized the foreign state's in-
terest in winding up the affairs of its own domestic business entities.
1 3
'
Although no general, universal "talismanic tests" exist, or are ap-
propriate, in determining whether comity should be afforded a foreign
act, 1 1 sovereign debt litigation is one specific area susceptible to such a
test by virtue of the analogy to bankruptcy law.
2. Public Policy Interests of the NODC and the United States in
Debt Litigation
The NODC's policy concerns in a debt moratorium are reasonably
straightforward. A NODC with insufficient foreign currency to service
its external debt and resolve its balance of trade problem has few alter-
natives. In some way it must signal its creditors that a restructuring is
urgently needed. The NODC must do this while maintaining its access
to new capital. It also must assure that the creditors' dilemma will be
resolved; if the NODC must pay some creditors now the purpose of
restructuring may be defeated. A nonrepudiatory moratorium may thus
appear to the NODC as the only way to achieve its goals.
U.S. policy with regard to moratoria is more complex. The United
States has been strongly supportive of the restructuring process. 3 U.S.
law has also long recognized that although outright repudiations are
unlawful, sovereign governments have the power to affect contractual
obligations through moratoria or similar legislation in an economic
emergency.13 4 Moreover, U.S. bankruptcy law permits and, in fact, en-
130. Drexel Burnham Lambert v. A. W. Galadari, 610 F. Supp. 114, 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 777 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1985). But see Allied
Bank H, 757 F.2d at 516.
131. Cunard Steamship Company v. Salen Reefer Services, 773 F.2d 452, 458 (2d
Cir. 1985).
132. See Laker, 731 F.2d at 956 (Starr, J., dissenting). ("Few hard-and-fast rules
or talismanic tests are to be found.") At one time some courts balanced the foreign
state's interest against the forum's interest under the factual circumstances. However,
this balancing test has led to unfortunate results and has fallen into disfavor. Id. at
950. Further, reciprocity is not a necessary factor in granting comity. "As Judge
Learned Hand explained, the Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot 'certainly did not
mean to hold that an American court was to recognize no obligations or duties arising
elsewhere until it appeared that the sovereign of the loan reciprocally recognized simi-
lar obligations existing here. That doctrine I am happy to say is not a part of American
jurisprudence.' " Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 300
F.2d 741, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), af'd, 267 U.S. 22 (1925), quoted in Cunard, 773 F.2d
at 460.
133. See infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
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courages the extension of comity to foreign bankruptcy proceedings,"3 5
which are directly analogous as a matter of policy to debt moratoria.13 6
The commercial banks have maintained that debt moratoria are
attempts by the NODCs to repudiate their debts and that, therefore,
giving legal effect to these moratoria in U.S. litigation arising out of a
default would place "billions of dollars of loans .. .at the complete
mercy of foreign governments around the world.' 37 Neither claim is
correct. Despite assertions that debt moratoria give NODCs "complete
freedom to defer unilaterally" their debt payments and "strengthen im-
mensely" their bargaining position,' 8 as a practical matter they do
neither.3
The NODCs have not used moratoria to repudiate their debt.
Moratoria have been declared only to suspend payments temporarily
while the NODC is unable to make them because of urgent foreign
currency shortages resulting from their balance of trade deficits. For
example, Costa Rica would have been forced to expend ninety percent
of its export earnings to service its public debt.140 Concurrent with a
promulgation of the moratoria, the NODCs have requested prompt re-
negotiation.'" The NODCs' continuing need for external credit com-
pels this request. They simply cannot afford to be cut off from the in-
ternational credit market due to their repudiation."42 Thus, a debt
moratorium is not a repudiation of contractual obligations but rather a
135. See 11 U.S.C. §§304-05 (1982).
136. See infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
137. Brief of the New York Clearing House Association as Amicus Curiae at 26,
Allied Bank I, No. 83-7714, slip op. (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 1985). See also Brief of the
New York Clearing House Association as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing at 29, Allied
Bank II, 757 F.2d at 516. ("Costa Rica's indefinite suspension of principal and interest
payments ... is clearly ... an effective confiscation of property ....") (quoting Libra
Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870, 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
The banks' claims have been echoed by the press, see, e.g., Hermann, New York Law
Unsafe for Loan Agreements, Fin. Times, May 24, 1984, at 34, col. 4, and domestic
business interests, see, e.g., Brief of the Rule of Law Committee and the Komal For-
eign Trade Council, Inc. as Amicus Curiae, Allied Bank I, No. 83-7714, slip op.
138. Hermann, supra note 137, at 34, col. 4.
139. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
140. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 1981: Submitted to the House
Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97 Cong., 2d
Sess., 393-94 (1982).
141. Costa Rica, for example, stated that it desired "to negotiate the restructure
of its external debt, so as to be able to pay all its creditors in full, with interest, on an
equitable and nonpreferential basis." Defendant's Rehearing Brief, supra note 68, at
12. In the Mexican restructuring the government entered into negotiations with its
creditors almost immediately, and announced a restructuring program a few months
after its moratorium. Tapia, supra note 22, at 4-5.
142. See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
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signal from the NODC to its creditors that restructuring of its obliga-
tions is urgently needed. This signal is necessitated by the absence of
formal procedures for a NODC to initiate a restructuring.
43
The same compelling economic and political reasons that require a
NODC to maintain access to foreign capital markets also mean that
recognizing a debt moratorium will not give the NODC unilateral con-
trol of the bargaining process. A tenuous balance of power exists be-
tween the major banks and the NODCs; if the NODC defaults then
the banks cannot recover their losses from available attachable assets,
but if the banks refuse the NODC additional credit then the NODC
faces economic and perhaps political collapse. 44 When a U.S. court
gives legal effect to a debt moratorium it does not affect this balance of
power. The major banks thus are forced to renegotiate whether the
NODC formally declares a moratorium or simply defaults.1 45 Where
the smaller banks are concerned, giving effect to a moratorium does not
destroy the balance of power but rather creates a balance in a manner
directly analogous to U.S. bankruptcy law and policy.'
46
Section 301 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code147 allows a debtor facing
default to voluntarily enter bankruptcy by filing a petition with the ap-
propriate federal bankruptcy court. Once the debtor so files, all collec-
tion procedures by individual creditors are automatically stayed,' 48 so
as to permit the insolvent debtor an opportunity to formulate a reor-
ganization plan while protected "from [a] mad scramble of creditors
for assets" of the debtor.' 49 Thus, subject to court approval of its plans,
a debtor may not only suspend payment to its creditors but also compel
its creditors to join a reorganization. 150 The law permits this reorgani-
143. See supra notes 56-76 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 209-44 and accompanying text.
147. 11 U.S.C. §301 (1982). Three or more creditors, holding aggregate claims
worth $5,000 more than the value of their security interests, if any, may petition the
court for involuntary proceedings against the debtor. Id. §303(b)(1). If the debtor con-
tests the petition, the creditors must show either that the debtor failed to make due
payments or that a custodian administering the debtor's estate was appointed within
120 days of the filing of the petition. Id. §303(h).
148. 11 U.S.C. §361 (1982).
149. In re Frigitemp Corp., 8 B.R. 284, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) quoting Fidelity
Mortgage Investors v. Camellia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1093, reh'g denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977); Allied Bank I, No. 83-7714
slip op.
150. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a confirmed reorganization plan is binding on
any creditor of the debtor, whether or not the creditor accepted the plan. For a reor-
ganization plan to be confirmed, it must have been accepted by each class of creditors
where the holders of "at least two-thirds of allowed claims in amount and more than
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zation to bind even dissenting creditors because in many cases the
debtor's value as a going concern is greater than the liquidated value of
its assets. Moreover, reorganization is essential to reaching the optimal
solution to the creditors' dilemma.15 '
Even if the bankruptcy proceedings are initiated by a debtor in a
foreign country, the Bankruptcy Code permits the same result. Under
sections 304 and 305, the court may enjoin U.S. collection actions
against the debtor or dismiss an involuntary petition brought in the
United States if foreign proceedings meeting certain basic fairness
norms of a bankruptcy proceeding are underway in the foreign state.
152
U.S. courts are "not obliged to protect the positions of fast-moving
American and foreign attachment creditors over the policy favoring
uniform administration in a foreign court."'5 U.S. courts have gener-
ally extended comity to foreign bankruptcy laws, both under section
305 and general comity rules, that are not identical in operation to
U.S. bankruptcy law, provided "there is nothing inherently vicious,
wicked, immoral or shocking to the prevailing American moral sense"
in the foreign law.' 54 Indeed, it is "the firm policy of American courts
[to stay] actions against a corporation which is the subject of a bank-
ruptcy proceeding in another jurisdiction."' 155
Though there are no formal bankruptcy procedures for foreign na-
tions, a debt moratorium serves as the functional equivalent.' 56 Giving
effect to a moratorium that does not repudiate the NODC's debt but
rather merely defers payment while a restructuring is negotiated has
the same effect as the automatic stay of domestic bankruptcy proceed-
ings under section 362 or as the abstention of U.S. courts during for-
eign proceedings under section 305. The debtor NODC - like the pri-
vate debtor under the Code - simply obtains a brief deferral of its
obligations and protection from a "mad scramble of creditors" while
negotiations proceed. Thus, as the Second Circuit held initially in Al-
one-half in number of the allowed claims" have approved the plan. Note that the court
will confirm such a plan only if the requirements of §1129 are also met. Id. §1126(c).
151. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
152. 11 U.S.C. §§304-05 (1982). See infra notes 209-31 and accompanying text.
153. In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
154. Id. at 631. See also Cornfield v. Investors Overseas Services, Ltd., 471 F.
Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (extending comity to Canadian bankruptcy proceedings).
155. Cornfield, 471 F.Supp. at 1259. See, e.g., Drexel Burnham Lambert, 777
F.2d at 877.
156. "The bankruptcy-equivalent for a foreign state itself is the purported decla-
ration by its government of a moratorium on the payment of indebtedness, external or
otherwise, or other public admission by the government of an inability to pay indebted-
ness when due." Ryan, supra note 83, at 97. See also Allied Bank I, No. 83-7714, slip
op. at 8.
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lied Bank I,1" a nonrepudiatory moratorium is fully consistent with
U.S. bankruptcy procedures and is not "shocking to the prevailing
American moral sense." The decision to grant comity was therefore
correct. 3 s
B. The Allied Bank Cases
1. Facts
The Allied Bank cases were a product of the Costa Rican debt
restructuring of 1983. Similar to many other Latin American NODCs,
Costa Rica confronted a crippling balance of payments deficit as a re-
sult of external economic shocks and ill-fated domestic policy re-
sponses. This balance of payments deficit caused Costa Rica to experi-
ence a shortage of foreign currency with which to repay its external
debt, 59 including debt owed to the thirty-nine banks in the Allied Bank
Syndicate. The Central Bank of Costa Rica and the President of Costa
Rica, in an effort to alleviate the crisis, ordered a temporary suspension
of payment of the external debt.
Two years of negotiation produced a debt restructuring agreement
satisfactory to 170 out of 171 of Costa Rica's creditors. Initially, how-
ever, the thirty-nine banks comprising the Allied syndicate chose not to
join the restructuring and filed suit against the Costa Rican debtors
seeking payment of the debt in U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York. After the district court dismissed Allied's com-
157. Allied Bank I, No. 83-7714, slip op. at 8. The Allied Bank I court denied
relief on the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Canada Southern Railway Co. v.
Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883) which held, by analogy to U.S. bankruptcy law, that a
Canadian Act of Parliament binding dissenting creditors to a reorganization of a Cana-
dian government owned railway barred suit by U.S. citizens. who held bonds of the
railway. See infra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
158. Professor Quale notes the anomaly the Allied Bank II decision creates on
this point:
A sovereign nation and, generally, state-owned banks and other state agencies can-
not be the subject of bankruptcy proceedings in their own countries. Therefore,
they would not be eligible to invoke section 305 to enjoin an action such as that
brought by Allied. Ironically, a private borrower that was eligible for bankruptcy
proceedings in its home country could, on the other hand, invoke section 305 to
enjoin a collection action brought against it in the United States. Yet if a private
debtor could obtain the benefits of section 305 a court might, under appropriate
circumstances, be justified, in extending the same benefits, by analogy, to a sover-
eign or state-owned debtor.
Quale, Allied Banks' Effect on International Lending, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1985,
at 30.
159. See supra notes 20-52 and accompanying text.
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plaint on the basis of the act of state doctrine,160 all except one of the
members of the Allied syndicate joined in the restructuring. The lone
dissenting creditor, Fidelity Union Trust Bank, appealed the district
court's dismissal.161
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed.'62 The court did not rule
on the act of state issue relied on by the district court, and based its
opinion instead on the doctrine of comity,163 applying the reasoning of
the Supreme Court in Canada Southern Railway Co. v. Gebhard,'"4 in
reaching its decision.'65
At this point the plot developed some curious twists. Fidelity suc-
cessfully petitioned for a rehearing by the court of appeals. The court
also granted the petition of the New York Clearing House Association
(NYCHA) to file a brief as amicus curiae, supporting Fidelity. The
NYCHA is a group of twelve of the major U.S. banks, most of whom
had large sovereign debt portfolios. At first glance, the position taken
by the NYCHA seems inexplicable, as it would have been contrary to
their interests to undermine their own restructuring agreement. The
major banks, in fact, likely perceived Fidelity as a loose cannon, poten-
tially blocking the restructuring of several hundred million dollars of
debt. Therefore, the NYCHA's position can only be explained by long-
term legal considerations. The NYCHA likely desired to use the legal
precedent that would be established by an opinion favorable to Fidelity
in future negotiations with sovereign debtors. This would enable U.S.
banks to seize what assets of a sovereign debtor they could, which
160. Allied Bank, 566 F. Supp. at 1440.
161. In their petition for certiorari, the Costa Rican debtor banks challenged the
wisdom of a U.S. court allowing a sole recalcitrant creditor, who refused to join the
restructuring agreement, to secure a judgment for payment of the debt from possibly
nonexistent funds. Although at that time, and at present, a paucity of case law on this
issue existed, a recent New York state court decision has strongly implied that the
general welfare of syndicated lending limits the right of individual creditors in the syn-
dicate to by-pass a restructuring agreement between the syndicate and the debtor by
litigating. The court held that "disparate and mutually antagonistic claims ... [make]
impossible an orderly approach to the financing of the debt." The court reached its
decision in the context of the Venezuelan restructuring where "[a] majority of the
constituent banks and the depositors evidently have agreed to go along with the situa-
tion and not insist on precipitating a crisis. Only one bank, the plaintiff, holding 12
percent of the entire obligation, is insisting on immediate payment." Credit Francais
International, S.A. v. Sociedad Financiera de Comerei, C.A., 490 N.Y.S.2d 670, 684
(Sup. Ct. 1985).
162. Allied Bank I, No. 83-7714, slip op.
163. See supra notes 116-32 and accompanying text.
164. 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
165. For a fuller account of the facts presented in this case, see Defendants' Re-
hearing Brief, supra note 68.
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would further cripple a struggling NODC's economy. The mere possi-
bility of such action could be used as a bargaining chip by creditor
banks, particularly if used in conjunction with the banks' ability to cut
off new credit to the NODCs.
The Executive Branch of the United States, which had not previ-
ously entered the case, also successfully petitioned for leave to file a
brief as amicus curiae in support of Fidelity. The position of the
United States also appeared to be self-contradictory because the
United States had previously been a strong supporter of both the re-
structuring process generally and the Costa Rican restructuring specifi-
cally. Presumably, the intervention of the United States was the result
of political pressure by the banks, both directly and indirectly through
Congress.
On rehearing, the court of appeals reversed itself,166 now holding
that Costa Rica's debt moratorium was contrary to U.S. law and policy
and therefore not entitled to recognition in U.S. courts. The court also
held that the act of state doctrine was inapplicable. The Costa Rican
banks withdrew their petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court
because Fidelity, presumably as a result of pressure from the United
States and the NYCHA, joined the restructuring agreement, after the
agreement was filed.
2. Analysis
In reversing its earlier position, the Second Circuit stated that its
prior conclusion that the Costa Rican moratorium was consistent with
U.S. policy "arose primarily from [its] belief that the legislative and
executive branches of our government fully supported Costa Rica's ac-
tions" but that on rehearing the Department of Justice's amicus brief
had persuaded it otherwise.16 7 Prior to the decision in Allied Bank I,
both Congress and the Executive expressed strong support for the
Costa Rican restructuring. The Executive, pursuant to the Foreign As-
sistance Act, twice certified that continued aid to Costa Rica was "in
the national interest."166 The Foreign Assistance Act prohibits U.S. aid
to any state in default of its loan obligations to the United States unless
the President certifies that such aid is in the national interest. Congress
responded by approving increased economic assistance for Costa
166. Allied Bank 11, 757 F.2d at 516.
167. Id. at 519.
168. H. R. ExEc. Doc. No. 671, 129 CONG. REc. H1461 (daily ed. Mar. 21,
1983); H. R. Doc. No. 1990, 128 CoNG. REC. H8243 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1983). The
aid to Costa Rica was certified pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 2370(q) (1982).
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Rica, 16 9 and by twice passing concurrent resolutions expressing "full
support of the Congress for the Republic of Costa Rica and its demo-
cratic institutions as that country responds to the current economic cri-
sis. '170 Such Presidential and Congressional joint actions are the clear-
est expression of government policy.171
In addition to providing economic assistance and political support
to Costa Rica, the U.S. government also participated in the reschedul-
ing of Costa Rica's external debt. In January 1983, the U.S. govern-
ment joined the other members of the Paris Club in signing an Agreed
Minute recommending a rescheduling of principal and interest owed by
the Costa Rican government and its public sector institutions to the
creditor governments. The creditor governments, including the United
States, also required that Costa Rica seek comparable rescheduling by
its commercial bank creditors and avoid inequitable treatment of differ-
ent categories of creditors.17 1
The United States has generally been a strong supporter of the
restructuring process throughout the developing world. 171 It has been
an important source of funds for the NODCs both through direct loans
and guarantees of private bank loans. 17 ' The government also played a
key role in many of the negotiations and was an active participant in
the Paris Club process. Most importantly, it was a key figure in the
169. Costa Rica received an aggregate of $320 million in financial aid in fiscal
years 1982-84. Review of Proposed Economic and Security Assistance Requests for
Latin America and the Caribbean: Hearings and Markup Before the Subcomm. on
Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., Ist
Sess. 23 (1983).
170. H.R. CON. RES. 423, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. H8508 (1982)
(daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983). Accord H. R. CON. RES. 194, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129
CONG. REc. H8575 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983).
171. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring); see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 (1981)
("When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,
his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right
plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he
be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty.").
172. Allied Bank I, No. 83-7714, slip op. at 6.
173. Proposals for Legislation to Increase the Resources of the International
Monetary Fund: Hearings before the Subcomm. on International Finance and Mone-
tary Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1983) (statement of Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Trea-
sury). See also, Hearings before the House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban
Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-68 (1983) (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman,
Federal Reserve Board of Governors).
174. See Tapia, supra note 22, at 5. The U.S. Department of Energy loaned Mex-
ico $1 billion, while U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation - a governmental agency -
guaranteed an additional $1 billion loan.
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political process that pressured the small banks into joining the restruc-
turing process. 175
Despite these expressions of policy, the U.S. government filed an
amicus brief following Allied Bank I, urging a reversal.' 7 The govern-
ment's brief recognized the urgent need for restructuring NODC debt
and stated that the United States was "strongly supportive" of the re-
structuring process. 7' The government argued, however, that giving ef-
fect to NODC debt moratoria would upset the restructuring process by
discouraging additional lending by the commercial banks and by en-
couraging NODCs to use moratoria to obtain concessions from their
creditors rather than to negotiate lasting solutions to their financial
problems. 178 The government argued further that moratoria differ from
bankruptcy proceedings because no neutral tribunal arbitrating be-
tween the creditors and the NODC exists. 79 Both the government's
argument and the court's adoption of it are flawed in a number of
respects.
The government's brief ignores the creditors' dilemma and the in-
centives which led to its resolution. As noted, the NODCs have strong
political and economic incentives to renegotiate. 80 The small banks,
however, have strong incentives not to renegotiate but rather to pursue
individual collection action. These incentives are inherent in the credi-
tors' dilemma, and were overcome only through political pressure and,
as the government acknowledges, "peer pressure from fellow credi-
tors." 181 Thus, it is not the NODCs that must be provided with incen-
tives to renegotiate, but rather the small banks.
Enforcing a debt moratorium provides incentive necessary to in-
duce the small banks to negotiate; the small banks will not be able to
pursue individual action because the NODC moratorium will be a com-
plete defense to such an action. Thus, as in Chapter 11 reorganizations,
the small creditor is compelled to join, thereby eliminating the credi-
175. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
176. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Allied Bank I, No. 83-7714,
slip op. [hereinafter cited as U.S. Brief].
177. Id. at 7-12.
178. Id. at 6-7, 11-12.
179. Id. at 13-14.
180. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
181. U.S. Brief, supra note 176, at 17 n.12. See generally supra notes 97-101 and
accompanying text. As the government brief notes, in some cases the incentive to pur-
sue individual collection action is reduced by clauses in the syndicated loan agreement
requiring the individual litigant to share any sums recovered with all loan participants.
U.S. Brief, supra note 176, at 17 n.12. However, such clauses are not always included.
Id. Moreover, these clauses would not eliminate the incentives to pursue individual
actions or actions by a syndicate composed of small banks.
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tors' dilemma and promoting the collective optimal result.' 82 Such a
procedure provides a more certain method of reaching the "best" result
than ad hoc political pressure, and, therefore, reduces both the uncer-
tainty and the costs of achieving a restructuring. If the small creditor
knows it can not pursue individual action, the costs of bargaining are
reduced because lengthy negotiations between the governments, the
major banks, and small creditors are eliminated.1 83 The creditors' abil-
ity to exclude the NODC from external capital markets in turn assures
that the NODC will also pursue the collective optimum.'84 Moreover,
as with domestic bankruptcy law, 18 5 the mere presence of a regime
under which moratoria are enforced will provide such incentives. The
moratorium thus creates a balance of power, rather than destroying
one. The need for such a balance of power is inherent in the recognition
that the United States cannot expect to have international trade con-
ducted solely on its own terms, a recognition which underlies comity.'8 6
Giving effect to a debt moratorium also will not discourage addi-
tional lending. As a practical matter, lending will continue because
there is no alternative. Lending continues whether the loans can be en-
forced or not because the major banks can only recoup their losses by
renegotiation and the extension of new credit, and not by litigation.
1 8 7
As a result, substantial foreign sovereign lending continued in the wake
of Allied Bank .s18s
The government's argument that debt moratoria should not be
considered as equivalent to bankruptcy proceedings because of the lack
of a neutral tribunal is also flawed. It unnecessarily exalts form over
substance. Despite proposals to the contrary, it is generally recognized
that a formal tribunal dealing with NODC debt would be impractical
and unnecessary. 89 Moreover, the IMF's increasingly important role as
an intermediary between the banks and the NODCs fills essentially the
182. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
183. Jackson, supra note 76, discusses the similar problem in domestic creditor
bargaining situations. The entire Jackson article presents a thorough analysis of the
creditor's dilemma in the domestic context.
184. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
188. In the few months following the Allied Bank I decision, between April and
September of 1984, large loans were either made to or guaranteed by the foreign sover-
eigns of Mexico, Chile, Brazil, Malaysia, Turkey, and Ireland. See Defendants' Re-
hearing Brief, supra note 68, at 24 n.32.
189. Ryan, supra note 83, at 128-31 (discusses the problems inherent in setting up
an arbitration panel); Note, supra note 22, at 332-33.
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same role." The IMF's role is directly "analogous to that of a court in
a Chapter 11 proceeding because it reviews and typically endorses the
rehabilitation plan on which the renegotiation process is based."19
U.S. courts have long recognized the existence of a governmental
power analogous to a court's bankruptcy powers even in the absence of
formal bankruptcy proceedings. This power of both federal and state
governments to affect their prior contractual obligations and those of
their residents has long been recognized by U.S. courts."9 2 In the early
case of Canada Southern Railway Co. v. Gebhard,"'9 the Supreme
Court held that a Canadian reorganization of a government-owned rail-
way was binding on dissenting U.S. creditors. The creditors' objected
that:
For the future to uphold the defence, the Court must say to inves-
tors: though before purchasing bonds of foreign countries you ex-
amine carefully their laws, and find no restriction on the issue of
such bonds, and no reservation of power to the legislative authority
to destroy such bonds by an after act, yet whenever the Legislature
of such foreign country may see fit to pass an act invalidating your
bonds, you must forthwith deliver them up, notwithstanding you
are beyond the jurisdiction of such country; notwithstanding your
bonds were payable at your own place of residence; and notwith-
standing you invoke the aid of your own Courts in the premises.'"
The Court justified this unilateral reorganization by drawing an anal-
ogy to bankruptcy proceedings:
[u]nder such circumstances [the sovereign's act] is no more
than is done in bankruptcy when a 'composition' agreement
with the bankruptcy debtor, if assented to by the required ma-
jority of creditors, is made binding on the nonassenting minor-
ity. In no just sense do such governmental regulations deprive a
190. See supra note 70 and accompanying text; Santucci, supra note 55 (discuss-
ing Art. VIII, §2, of the IMF agreement and how this agreement can give the IMF
equal leverage over both lenders and borrowers).
191. Note, supra note 22, at 333 n.160.
192. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §1904 (1982) (granting the federal government the
power to control extensions of credit); Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290
U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding state mortgage moratorium); Ropico, Inc. v. City of New
York, 425 F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (upholding moratorium on payment of city
bonds).
193. Canada Southern, 109 U.S. at 527.
194. Brief and Points for Defendant in Error at 32-33, Canada Southern, 109
U.S. at 527.
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person of his property without due process of law. They simply
require each individual to so conduct himself for the general
good as not unnecessarily to injure another.'
The Supreme Court reached this holding despite the absence of a
neutral tribunal - the reorganization was imposed by legislative act of
the government owning the debtor, not by judicial process - and de-
spite the absence of any notice or opportunity for the creditors to be
heard. 6 The Court reasoned that unless all creditors could be bound
by the reorganization the plan would fail, and, therefore, the lack of a
neutral tribunal and notice were immaterial. Giving effect to the reor-
ganization was required by "the true spirit of international comity."'
91 7
NODC moratoria are considerably less intrusive on creditors'
rights than the reorganization at issue in Canada Southern. Typically,
these moratoria do not include a unilateral restructuring plan but sim-
ply request mere negotiation of a bilateral agreement. Thus, they pro-
vide both notice and an opportunity to be heard, 9 8 and should be
195. Canada Southern, 109 U.S. at 527.
196. Id. at 542-43 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The government's brief argued that
Canada Southern should be distinguished from NODC debt moratoria because the
Canadian Parliament substituted for a bankruptcy court and did not purport to affect
its own debts. U.S. Brief, supra note 176, at 13. Neither contention is persuasive. Just
as the Canadian Parliament substituted for a bankruptcy court, so does the government
of the NODC. Second, the Canadian Parliament was not neutral. It determined that
the railway "affected the public interests, and the keeping of the railway opened for
traffic was of the utmost importance to the people of the Dominion." Canada Southern,
109 U.S. at 538. Such a finding is no more or less neutral than a NODC's determina-
tion that public policy requires a temporary suspension of debt payment. Third, the
Canadian Parliament was in fact modifying the obligations of a government owned
agency - just as a NODC may suspend payments by one of its agencies.
197. Canada Southern, 109 U.S. at 539.
198. Fidelity and the NYCHA argued that the Central Hanover (Central Hano-
ver Bank and Trust Co. v. Siemens and Halske Aktiengesellschaft, 15 F. Supp. 927
(S.D.N.Y.), ajfd 84 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 585 (1936)) line of
cases provide a basis for an exception to Canada Southern. This line of cases, holding
that German exchange control laws were not a defense to contract suits, is inapplicable
to nondiscriminatory, nonrepudiatory NODC debt moratoria. These cases involved dis-
criminatory repudiations of debts and contractual obligations (15 F. Supp. at 930),
which are not involved in typical NODC moratoria. See supra notes 140-42 and ac-
companying text. Moreover, they have been implicitly overruled by the adoption of the
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, art. VIII,
§2(b), 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501 (providing that exchange control regulations
contrary to the member's exchange control regulation are unenforceable). See Banco
Frances E. Brasileiro S.A. v. Doe, 36 N.Y.2d 592, 598, 331 N.E.2d 502, 506-07
(1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 867 (1975) (questioning whether New York would ad-
here to Central Hanover in light of the Agreement).
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granted comity under Canada Southern.
The Second Circuit's deference to the U.S. government is equally
subject to criticism. 99 Although the opinion does not refer to it, the
reasoning invokes the rationale behind the Bernstein doctrine. In Bern-
stein v. N.V. Nederlandsche Amerikaansche,00 the court deferred to a
U.S. State Department letter suggesting that the act of state doctrine
need not be applied to the case in controversy. The court then pro-
ceeded to address the merits. The Second Circuit's reversal of its com-
ity decision in Allied Bank I upon receipt of the government's brief is
directly analogous to Bernstein, in that both courts considered the De-
partments of Justice and State to represent the official U.S. position.
The Bernstein doctrine and similar judicial deference in other ar-
eas - such as sovereign immunity or the standing in U.S. courts of
unrecognized governments - has largely been repudiated. In First Na-
tional City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, six Justices rejected the
Bernstein approach to the act of state doctrine.20 1 In the area of sover-
eign immunity, judicial deference to the views of the Executive has
been similarly criticized. The adoption of the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act was largely motivated by a desire to end this practice.20 2 The
judiciary's long standing tradition of deference to the government's po-
sition concerning an unrecognized foreign government's standing to
bring suit in U.S. courts has also been criticized by both judicial and
academic authority. 203
199. In reversing itself, the court's views underwent a remarkable change. For
example, in Allied Bank I, No. 83-7714, slip op. at 8, the court stated that "Costa
Rica's prohibition of payment of debt was not a repudiation of the debt, but rather was
merely a deferral of payments while it attempted in good faith to renegotiate its obliga-
tions." In Allied Bank II, 757 F.2d at 519, the court held the same action to be an
"attempted unilateral restructuring of private obligations .. " See also Id. at 521 n.3
(describing the action as a "taking"). All of which was done without citation of
authority.
200. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
201. 406 U.S. 759, 773 (1972) (Douglas and Powell, JJ., concurring); Id. at 776-
77 (Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
202. See Hearings on H.R. 11315 before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law
and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94 Cong., 2d Sess.
24, 26-27 (1976) (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor, Department of State)
("In virtually every other country in the world, sovereign immunity is a question of
international law decided exclusively by the courts and not by institutions concerned
with foreign affairs [e.g., the Justice Department]").
203. See e.g., Alder, The Unrecognized Government in the Courts of the United
States, 5 VA. J. INT'L L. 36 (1964) ("[tlhough the political branch refuses de facto
recognition, de facto judicial recognition may be given in determining the rights and
obligations of private parties."); Lubman, The Unrecognized Government in American
Courts: Upright v. Mercury Business Machines, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 275 (1962)
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This trend away from the Bernstein doctrine's unthinking defer-
ence to the Executive is based on the recognition that the Bernstein
approach is "an abdication of the judicial function... requiring blind
adherence . . . to the Executive."20 In First National City Bank, Jus-
tice Brennan wrote:
The consequence of adopting the Bernstein approach would
only be to bring the rule of law both here at home and in the
relations of nations into disrespect. Indeed, the fate of the indi-
vidual claimant would be subject to the political considerations
of the Executive Branch. Since those considerations change as
surely as administrations change, similarly situated litigants
would not be likely to obtain even-handed treatment. 0 5
The enforceability of loan agreements, extension of comity to foreign
law, choice of governing law, and examination of precedent and policy
are judicial questions. 20 6 Even prior to First National City Bank, Jus-
tice Stewart noted, "[rlesolution of [such important issues] . . . cannot
vary from day to day with the shifting winds at the State
Department. ' 2
0 7
Rather than simply deferring to the position of the U.S. govern-
ment as an amicus party to litigation, the courts should undertake a
careful examination not only of the policies expressed by the United
States both as a party and in its recent actions and more broadly as an
actor in the international economic system, but also of the legitimate
interests of the foreign state and its creditors, and the facts and equities
("[Courts should] restrain the judicial proclivity for unthinking deference to what the
courts consider to be, or are told is, national policy."); Recent Decision, 14 VA. J. INT'L
L. 329 (1974); Upright v. Mercury Business Machines Co., Inc., 13 A.D.2d 36, 213
N.Y.S.2d 417 (1961).
204. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 790-92
(1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) While Justice Brennan dissented from the ultimate
holding that was dispositive of the case, he and five other Justices advocated the rejec-
tion of the Bernstein doctrine. In his concurring opinion Justice Powell also found that
"[t]he reasoning of Sabbatino implicitly rejects the [Bernstein] exception. Moreover, I
would be uncomfortable with a doctrine which would require the judiciary to receive
the Executive's permission before invoking its jurisdiction. Such a notion, in the name
of the doctrine of separation of powers, seems to me in conflict with that very doc-
trine." Id. at 773 (Powell, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 790.
206. See Anderson v. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 289 N.Y. 9, 15, 43
N.E.2d 502, 504 (1942) ("The scope and effect within this state of a decree promul-
gated by the [foreign] government are judicial questions .... ").
207. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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of the case. °8 Such an examination in the Allied Bank litigation would
have considered the bankruptcy analogy, the creditors' dilemma and
the correct interpretation of its resolution, the urgent need of Costa
Rica to restructure its external debt, and the interests of Costa Rica's
creditors. This examination would have revealed that Costa Rica's ac-
tions did not fall within Justice Cardozo's public policy exception to the
comity doctrine. The analysis of general U.S. law and policy above sug-
gests that debt moratoria should be granted comity in at least some
circumstances.
C. A Test for Comity in NODC Debt Litigation
Not all debt moratoria, of course, will necessarily be consistent
with U.S. policy and with the proper resolution of the creditors' di-
lemma. However, extension of the analogy between U.S. commercial
bankruptcy law and NODC debt restructuring suggests a workable
test.
Under section 305 of the Bankruptcy Code a U.S. court may de-
cline to exercise jurisdiction over a debtor if the interests of the debtor
and creditors so require or if there is a foreign proceeding pending, and
if the following six factors - specified in section 304(c) - are met:",
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests
in such estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against
prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in
such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of
property of such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in ac-
cordance with the order prescribed by this title;
208. "In a decentralized world .... a significant interest exists in having domestic
courts maintain a neutral role in the resolution of international disputes and the devel-
opment of international law." Davis, Domestic Development of International Law: A
Proposal for an International Concept of the Act of State Doctrine, 20 TEx. INT'L L.
J., 341, 362 (1984). "In the Bernstein context, Professor Abram Chayes, Legal Advisor
to the State Department of 1961-1964, stated, 'I submit that the best possible position
for the [State] Department vis t vis the foreign government in these circumstances is
to be able to show that we have an independent judiciary in this country. It adjudicates
whatever comes before it, and there is no way the Department can interfere.'" Id. at
362 n.88 quoting Chayes, The Aftermath of Sabbatino, Background Papers and Pro-
ceedings of the Seventh Hammarskjold Forum, The Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, p. 73, Jan. 11, 1965. Cf. Recent Decision, supra note 203, at 332-37,
which advocates the same approach in unrecognized government contexts.
209. 11 U.S.C. §305(a) (1982).
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(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh
start for the individual that such foreign proceeding
concerns.
2 10
These factors are guidelines only, and the legislative history of the stat-
ute indicates that Congress intended "to give the court the maximum
flexibility in handling [such] cases. 12 11 The courts are "to make the
appropriate orders under all the circumstances of each case, rather
than being provided with inflexible rules.121 2 The courts have used their
abstention power where the debtor and a majority of the creditors have
reached an acceptable reorganization but a few recalcitrant creditors
seek to overturn it, interpreting the factors flexibly and in favor of the
debtor.2 13
The factors specified in section 304(c) reflect the basic norms of
equality and nondiscrimination that underlie U.S. bankruptcy law.
They also reflect an appropriate resolution of the creditors' dilemma.
1 4
As noted, creditors would agree - absent the creditors' dilemma - to
a reorganization that provided for no individual collection efforts and
equitable repayment of principal and interest. This bargain is imposed
by domestic bankruptcy law. 21 5 A NODC's debt moratorium can serve
the same function. The principles of bankruptcy law thus suggest an
appropriate test for U.S. courts to use in determining the validity of a
NODC's debt moratorium.
1. Comity
It is odd that section 304 includes comity as one of the factors to
be considered by courts in declining to exercise jurisdiction over a
debtor, since relief under section 305 amounts to the extension of com-
ity to the foreign proceeding.2 16 Recognizing that the extension of com-
210. Id. §304(c).
211. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1978), reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5821 (1978).
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., In re Rimpull Corp., 26 B.R. 267 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Mo. 1982) (dis-
missing an involuntary petition filed by a minority of creditors dissenting from a reor-
ganization plan); In re Luftek, Inc., 6 B.R. 539 (Bkrtcy. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (dismissing
where debtors and most creditors had arranged a reorganization and additional loans).
214. See generally supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
216. See Culmer, 25 B.R. at 629 ("All of the factors listed in Section 304(c) have
historically been considered within a court's determination of whether to afford comity
to a proceeding, in a foreign nation.")
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ity is subject to the public policy exception, one court has held that it
would "look to the other relevant factors enumerated in section 304(c)
to determine whether the evidence presented as to [the foreign] law
indicates that its application ... would be wicked, immoral, or [would]
violate American law and public policy." 217 This interpretation of sec-
tion 304(c) seems sound given the absence of applicable legislative his-
tory. Thus, if the moratorium meets the five other section 304(c) fac-
tors it should be given effect under the doctrine of comity.
2. Just Treatment
The first factor for a court to consider in evaluating a NODC's
debt moratorium is whether the moratorium provides for "just treat-
ment of all holders of claims against"2 18 the NODC. "Just treatment"
requires provisions for equitable repayment of all creditors. 19
To require the moratorium to provide a detailed restructuring plan
would be inconsistent with the function of the moratorium: the morato-
rium should be intended to signal creditors that restructuring negotia-
tions are necessary and not to restructure the debt unilaterally. Just
treatment can be assured in several ways, without unilaterally restruc-
turing the debt. First, the debt moratorium should be nondiscrimina-
tory. It can be required to provide that debts owed to citizens of the
debtor will not be paid in foreign currency until renegotiation is com-
plete.220 Second, the moratorium should call for prompt negotiations.
Third, the NODC should agree only to an equitable distribution. Last,
the court can review the agreement once renegotiations have concluded,
if requested to do so by the litigating creditors, to assure that it pro-
vides for repayment of all creditors in full and with interest on an equi-
table and nonpreferential basis. Consistent with domestic application of
sections 304 and 305, these requirements - and those that follow -
should be interpreted flexibly and in favor of the debtor.
3. Avoidance of Prejudice
The moratorium and the resulting renegotiation should protect
creditors from "prejudice and inconvenience' ' 2 1 in restructuring the
NODC's debt. This can be assured by imposing several requirements.
217. Id.
218. 11 U.S.C. §304(c)(1) (1982).
219. Cf. Culmer, 25 B.R. at 629 (In liquidation, a foreign bankruptcy law pro-
vides just treatment if it "[pirovides a comprehensive procedure for the orderly and
equitable distribution of [the debtor's] assets among all the creditors.").
220. Cf. id. at 630 ("No preference is given to the claims of Bahamian citizens.").
221. 11 U.S.C. §304(c)(2) (1982).
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First, the court shall require adequate notice to all creditors of the mor-
atorium and restructuring negotiations.2 22 IMF participation in renego-
tiations could also be required. The IMF can act as would the trustee
or examiner under a Chapter 11 reorganization 223 and, in fact, increas-
ingly does so.
Formation of a creditors' committee to represent the creditors in
negotiations with the NODC is also necessary. Obviously, the hundreds
of banks involved in NODC restructuring can not all be represented at
the negotiation. However, the current ad hoc process provides for for-
mation of bank steering groups which perform a function directly anal-
ogous to Chapter 11 creditor committees. These bank steering groups
should be required to include representatives of all classes of affected
creditors. 22 4
Fourth, the court should require preparation of an equitable plan
of repayment analogous to repayment rules under Chapter 11. Last, it
should also require approval of such plan by at least the majority re-
quired by the Bankruptcy Code. 2 5 Requiring these provisions would
assure that the moratorium protects the creditors' interests and mini-
mizes inconveniences to them.
4. Nonpreferential Treatment
A basic postulate of bankruptcy law is avoidance of preferential
payments to some creditors. However, not all payments are considered
preferential.2 2 6 In the NODC debt context, several classes of transfers
should not be considered preferential. Payments to citizens of the
debtor should only be considered preferential if made in foreign cur-
rency. (Payments made in the NODC's currency are acceptable if pay-
ment to foreign creditors in domestic currency is not prohibited.) Only
if the NODC is actively paying its citizens in foreign currency are ex-
ternal creditors' interests affected. Payment to citizens in domestic cur-
rency cannot have a significant impact on the creditors' rights, but sus-
pending them would bring the NODC's economy to a standstill
222. Cf. Culmer, 25 B.R. at 630 ("Adequate notice of the [foreign] proceeding, is
required.").
223. See Note, supra note 22, at 334-35.
224. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. See also Note, supra note 22, at
335-36. Cf. 11 U.S.C. §1102 (providing that the seven creditors with the largest claims
are automatically included in the committee and that the court has discretion to in-
clude other representative creditors.)
225. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. Typically, the percentages re-
quired by the loan agreement will be significantly higher. See supra note 72 and ac-
companying text.
226. See 11 U.S.C. §547 (1982).
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(particularly in centralized economies), and this would in turn have a
significant impact on the NODC's ability to repay the foreign creditors.
Continued payment to official creditors, including the IMF and
other quasi-governmental bodies, should also not be considered prefer-
ential. NODC-official creditor negotiations normally proceed on sepa-
rate and prior tracks from the private bank loan restructuring.2 7 Be-
cause official creditor debt relief, especially IMF conditional relief, has
been required by the banks as a condition precedent to their renegoti-
ation and provides essential interim funding,228 payments to the official
creditors do not impair and may ultimately promote the private credi-
tors' interests. Clearly no preferential payments to private bank credi-
tors should be made, however. Provided that the moratorium prohibits
such payments, it should be held consistent with nonpreferential
treatment.
5. Payments
The Bankruptcy Code provides an elaborate priority scheme for
repayment of allowed claims.22 In a reorganization, all creditors
should be repaid, as much as possible, in full. Similarly, the debt mora-
torium and the following restructuring should provide a repayment
schedule analogous to that of the Code and assure that all creditors will
eventually be paid in full with interest.23
6. Fresh Start
The final section 304(c) factor, "the opportunity for a fresh
start," ' is inapplicable to sovereign debt restructuring. However, in a
sense restructuring does permit a "fresh start," by permitting the
NODC time to regain economic stability. Thus, perhaps the morato-
rium should state that the NODC will accept IMF conditionality and
otherwise seek economic security.
D. The Costa Rican Restructuring: A Case Study
Had the Second Circuit applied the preceding test to the Costa
Rican moratorium, it would have had to conclude that the decree de-
served recognition. The Central Bank decrees of August 27, 1981, pro-
vide that effective August 28, 1981, foreign exchange would not be
227. See supra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
229. See 11 U.S.C. §§507, 726 (1982).
230. Cf. Culmer, 25 B.R. at 630-31.
231. 11 U.S.C. §304(c)(6) (1982).
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available for the servicing of external debt, except for payment to offi-
cial creditors, which would be made "as long as the availability of for-
eign exchange in the country permits."2"2 The government decree of.
November 24, 1981, states that, to assure "harmony of decisions and
centralization of the decision making process" in the ongoing renegotia-
tions, external debt payments are not to be made without the approval
of the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance.2 33
The decrees comply with the requirements of just treatment. The
decree is nondiscriminatory in effect, if not in language, because all
internal debt to citizens or other creditors is payable in domestic cur-
rency.' " Thus, the limitation of the decree to external debt does not
discriminate against foreign creditors. Throughout the process Costa
Rica consistently sought to restructure its debt on an equitable basis
providing for equal treatment of similarly situated creditors and full
repayment of all obligations.'" Last, the complete agreement provides
for such repayment.2
3 6
The decrees also comply with the tests for avoidance of prejudice.
Costa Rica first approached its external creditors with a request for
restructuring on June 7, 198 1.237 All creditors were notified on July 27,
1981, that repayment of short-term debt was to be suspended. 23 8 The
banks thus had adequate notice of the forthcoming Central Bank de-
cree and the request for renegotiations. The IMF had been approached
by Costa Rica in early 1981, and on June 17, 1981, an agreement with
232. Resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of the Central Bank of Costa
Rica at meeting No. 3662-81, art. II. (Aug. 27, 1981), reprinted in Joint Appendix of
Plaintiff's - Appellant's and Defendant's - Appellee's Briefs at 198, 200-01, Allied
Bank I No. 83-7714, slip op. [hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix].
233. Executive Decree No. 13103-H, Nov. 24, 1981, La Gaceta No. 225, art. 2.,
reprinted in Joint Appendix, supra note 232, at 204, 206.
234. See Defendants' Rehearing Brief, supra note 68, at 11. ("The Costa Rican
decrees on their face apply only to external debt, debt payable in foreign currency...
because that was the practical problem faced. Costa Rican debtors are generally able
to pay foreign currency denominated debts in Costa Rica in colones [the Costa Rican
currency].")
235. Id. at 12. See also Step-by-Step, supra note 11, at 33-45 (describing the
restructuring process and the efforts to achieve an equitable result). Professor Quale
also notes that "[tihe Costa Rican decrees did not repudiate or confiscate the debts of
Costa Rican borrowers payable in a foreign currency. Those decrees did affect the
timing of the repayment of the Costa Rican banks' obligation but they did not purport
to affect the underlying obligation to pay which remained valid and enforceable."
Quale, supra note 158, at 26-27.
236. See Allied Bank I, No. 83-7714 slip op. at 5.
237. Step-by-Step, supra note 11, at 34.
238. Id. at 36.
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the IMF was concluded.239 IMF participation is therefore also satisfied.
Similarly, the requirement of formation of a bank steering group was
satisfied on September 25, 1981.140 Last, the restructuring agreement
was approved by 170 of 171 banks,"4 a percentage much higher than
that required by the Bankruptcy Code. The decrees thus avoid
prejudice to the affected creditors and satisfy this prong of the test to
determine their validity and enforceability in U.S. courts .
42
The requirement of nonpreferential treatment is also satisfied.
Equally situated creditors were treated equally, and only the official
creditors received additional payments. The continued payment of in-
ternal debt was necessary to keep Costa Rica's economy functioning.
Because the decrees prohibited all foreign bank debt servicing, no cred-
itor received payments that could be considered preferential.
Last, the moratorium provided Costa Rica with the necessary time
to regain its economic stability and organize a restructuring providing
for full, equitable repayment of its debts.'" All prongs of the test were




There is currently no formal method for a fiscally troubled NODC
to initiate negotiations with its private creditors. Debt moratoria serve
a useful signaling function in lieu of such a formal procedure. More-
over, debt moratoria are the only practical way of assuring that the
creditors' dilemma inherent in sovereign debt renegotiations will be re-
solved in the collectively optimal way at minimal cost.
Properly limited nondiscriminatory, nonrepudiatory moratoria
should, therefore, be given effect by U.S. courts. The test proposed by
239. Id. at 34, 45. A second IMF agreement was concluded in June of 1982.
240. Id. at 36.
241. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
242. Costa Rica also continued to pay its bondholders, but the banks eventually
agreed to permit such payments. Step-by-Step, supra note 11, at 43-45. Generally,
bondholders are not considered to be equally situated with bank lenders and most coun-
tries' laws give them preference. Id. at 34. Thus, the payments to bondholders should
not prevent extension of comity to the decrees.
243. See Defendants' Rehearing Brief, supra note 68, at 12-16.
244. Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York has
held that the foreign exchange control regulations adopted by Mexico in August of
1982 "cannot be construed as simply a repudiation of a government entity's 'commer-
cial debt' but were rather a conventional (device] of civilized nations faced with severe
monetary crises rather than the crude and total confiscation by force of a private per-
son's assets." Braka v. Bancomer, 584 F. Supp. 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), affid, 762 F.2d
222 (2d Cir. 1985).
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this article provides a coherent procedure for determining when comity
should be extended and would assure that the interests of all parties are
protected.
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VI. APPENDIX
The original opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit before rehearing in Allied Bank is not printed in the bound
volumes of the Federal Reporter. The Court's opinion is reproduced
here because of its significant references to the analogy between sover-
eign debt litigation and domestic bankruptcy law.
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PER CURIAM:
This appeal arises from the dismissal of an action by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Griesa,
J., on the basis of the act of state doctrine. Appellant, alleging default
on the obligations owed to it by appellees, sought to recover
$5,233,453.82, plus interest, attorneys' fees and costs.
We agree that the action should have been dismissed. We need not
address the question of whether the act of state doctrine applies be-
cause the actions of the Costa Rican government that caused the de-
fault are consistent with the policy and law of the United States.
Therefore, comity requires that the actions should be given effect in
United States courts.
BACKGROUND
Appellant Allied Bank International (Allied) is the agent for a
syndicate of thirty-nine banks. Appellees are three Costa Rican banks
which are owned by the Republic of Costa Rica and are subject to the
control of the Central Bank of Costa Rica (Central Bank). Appellees
maintain no employees or offices in New York. Neither do they con-
duct banking business there.
Appellees assumed the obligations at issue here in 1976 after the
failure of the Latin American Bank, a bank principally doing business
in Costa Rica, and pursuant to its subsequent reorganization. Appellees
issued new promissory notes and executed side letter agreements
(agreements) with appellant on June 30, 1976. Most of the negotiations
leading to the agreements and the actual execution of the agreements
occurred outside of the United States.
* Honorable Charles M. Metzner, United States District Judge for the Southern
District of New York, sitting by designation.
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Under the agreements, appellees were to make "unconditionally"
eleven semi-annual payments in New York City with United States
dollars. The agreements also recognized that the obligations were regis-
tered with the Central Bank, which would provide the necessary United
States currency. Although the agreements did not specify governing
law, they did provide for concurrent jurisdiction over disputes in New
York and in Costa Rica.
Under the agreements, appellees' failure to pay the required inter-
est or principal within thirty days of the payment date would constitute
default. Upon default, appellant could demand full payment of the
promissory notes. If failure to pay was due to the omission or refusal of
the Central Bank to release United States currency, default would be
excused for an additional ten days.
Appellees made the required payments until 1981 when the Re-
public of Costa Rica found itself in a severe economic crisis. On Au-
gust 27, 1981, in response to the crisis, the Central Bank resolved that
it would release no foreign currency for the payment of debts (with
minor exceptions inapplicable here). On November 24, 1981, the Presi-
dent of Costa Rica decreed that the appellees and other public sector
entities could pay external debts only with the express approval of the
Central Bank. The decree stated that such measures were necessary
because "presently the Government of Costa Rica is renegotiating its
External Debt and for this purpose there should be harmony of deci-
sions and centralization in the decision-making process." J.App. at 205.
The Central Bank informed appellees that the payment of external
debt in United States dollars was to be deferred. Consequently, appel-
lees failed to make the required payments on the subject obligations.
Appellant brought this suit for full payment under the agreements.
In the district court action, appellees did not contest their failure
to pay their obligations, but moved to dismiss appellant's action under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of
sovereign immunity, lack of in personam jurisdiction, insufficiency of
process and insufficiency of service of process. Appellant moved for
summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Appellees' defense to
the summary judgment motion was that payments on the obligations
had been prevented by the actions of the Republic of Costa Rica.
The court denied all of the motions. 566 F.Supp. 1440. It ex-
plained that the act of state doctrine barred the entry of summary
judgment for appellant. Entering such a judgment, the court explained,
would question the validity of a foreign state's action and would risk
embarrassment to the relations between the governments of the United
States and Costa Rica. Because the appellees raised actions of the
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Costa Rican government only as a defense to the summary judgment
motion, the court did not dismiss the action. Subsequently, on July 22,
1983, the action was dismissed by agreement of the parties after they
stipulated that no factual issues remained with respect to the act of
state doctrine.
While the action was still pending in the district court, negotia-
tions began for the rescheduling of payments of appellees' obligations.
On September 9, 1983, after the district court's dismissal, the appel-
lees, the government of Costa Rica and the Central Bank signed a refi-
nancing agreement with the coordinating agent for Costa Rica's exter-
nal creditors. Only one of the thirty-nine banks in the Allied Syndicate,
Fidelity Union Trust Company of New Jersey, refused to accept the
agreement. It is this lone bank that Allied now represents on appeal.
Appellees have made payments to the other thirty-eight banks as re-
quired in the refinancing agreement.
Costa Rica's economic crisis also caused its default on payments of
its intergovernmental obligations. When a country defaults on a loan
granted to it by the United States under the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, Pub.L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.), further aid to the defaulting country is
barred unless the President advises Congress that "assistance to such
country is in the national interest." 22 U.S.C. § 2370(q) (1982). Presi-
dent Reagan and the Congress reacted sympathetically to Costa Rica's
financial crisis and its default on Foreign Assistance Act loans. The
President advised that
[c]ontinuation of U.S. assistance to Costa Rica is consistent
with the commitment of this Administration and in Congress to
help Costa Rica regain economic viability. We therefore regard
such assistance, which is designed to help the Government with
financial and management reforms and with needed credit to
the private sector, as vital and in the national interest. We are
hopeful that bilateral debt restructuring will be completed
within the next several months.
Letters from Secretary of State George P. Shultz to Speaker of the
House Thomas P. O'Neill (Mar. 18, 1983 and Oct. 11, 1983), re-
printed in Br. of Appellees, App. A. The House of Representatives also
expressed "full support for the Republic of Costa Rica and its demo-
cratic institutions as that country responds to the current economic cri-
sis." H. Con. Res. 423, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Cong. Rec. H. 10206
(Dec. 17, 1982); see also H.Con.Res. 194, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
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Cong.Rec.H. 10350 (Nov. 17, 1983). In January 1983, the United
States joined several other nations in the signing of the Paris Club
Agreed Minute which rescheduled the intergovernmental debt of Costa
Rica. The Agreed Minute contained a provision recommending the
rescheduling of Costa Rica's commercial obligations. Br. of Appellees,
App.B. at 3.
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues that the act of state doctrine is inapplicable to
the present action because the situs of the obligations is New York.
The act of state doctrine precludes the examination of a foreign sover-
eign's confiscation of property within its own territory. United Bank
Ltd. v. Cosmic International Inc., 542 F.2d 868, 872 (2d Cir. 1976)
(quoting Republic of Iraq v. First National City bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51
(2d Cir. 1965) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027, 86
S.Ct. 648, 15 L.Ed.2d 540 (1966)). Thus, if the situs of the obligations
is Costa Rica, the district court properly dismissed the action. We need
not address appellant's argument, however, because the location of the
debts is not determinative of the outcome of the action. When the prop-
erty or contractual obligations affected by the foreign government's ac-
tions are located within the United States, our courts will give effect to
those actions "only if they are consistent with the policy and the law of
the United States." United Bank, 542 F.2d at 872 (quoting Republic of
Iraq, 353 F.2d at 51). Thus, if the situs of the obligations is the United
States, as the appellant claims in arguing that the act of state doctrine
is inapplicable, the actions of the Costa Rican government will still be
recognized as valid in United States courts if they are consistent with
the law and policy of the United States. See United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324, 57 S.Ct. 758, 81 L.Ed. 1134 (1937); Canada Southern
Railway Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 3 S.Ct. 363, 27 L.Ed. 1020
(1883); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank New York Trust
Co., 658 F.2d 903, 908-09 (2d Cir. 1981); cf. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halske Aktiengesellschaft, 15 F.Supp. 927,
930 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 84 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 585, 57 S.Ct. 110, 81 L.Ed. 431 (1936) (German bond laws
not given effect, because they did not involve "insolvency" and were
discriminatory).
The actions of Costa Rica that resulted in the prohibition of pay-
ments on external debt are consistent with the law and policy of the
United States. In Canada Southern Railway Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S.
527, 3 S.Ct. 363, 27 L.Ed. 1020 (1883), the Supreme Court bound
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New York bondholders to the Canadian government's reorganization of
the debts of the government-owned Canada Southern Railway. In or-
dering the dismissal of the bondholders' suit on the old bonds, the
Court stated:
[The plan] is in entire harmony with the spirit of bankrupt
laws, the binding force of which, upon those who are subject to
the jurisdiction, is recognized by all civilized nations. It is not
in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, which,
although prohibiting States from passing laws impairing the ob-
ligation of contracts, allows Congress "to establish . . . uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout the United
States." . . . Under these circumstances the true spirit of inter-
national comity requires that schemes of this character, legal-
ized at home, should be recognized in other countries.
Id. at 539, 3 S.Ct. at 371.
Similarly, Costa Rica's prohibition of payment of its external
debts is analogous to the reorganization of a business pursuant to
Chapter 11 of our Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (1982).
Under Chapter 11, all collection actions against a business filing an
application for reorganization are automatically stayed to allow the
business to prepare an acceptable plan for the reorganization of its
debts. 11 U.S.C. §§ 103(a), 362, 901(a) (1982). See In re Frigitemp
Corp., 8 B.R. 284 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1981) (purpose of § 362 is to give
insolvent debtor opportunity to formulate plans for repayment and re-
organization with protection from mad scramble of creditors for as-
sets). Costa Rica's prohibition of payment of debt was not a repudia-
tion of the debt but rather was merely a deferral of payments while it
attempted in good faith to renegotiate its obligations. That Costa
Rica's renegotiation of its debts is also consistent with our foreign pol-
icy is indicated by the support voiced for the renegotiation by both the
legislative and executive branches of our government. Because the de-
cree and resolutions of the Costa Rican government that resulted in
appellees' default were consistent with the law and policy of the United
States, their validity should be recognized in United States courts.
Canada Southern Railway Co., 109 U.S. at 539, 3 S.Ct. at 371.
Appellant also argues that Costa Rica's actions should not be
given effect because the government of Costa Rica was acting as a
commercial entity and not as a sovereign nation. Although the actions
of Costa Rica affected commercial activity, Costa Rica was clearly act-
ing as a sovereign in preventing a national fiscal disaster. See Hunt v.
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Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984,
98 S.Ct. 608, 54 L.Ed.2d 477 (1977); see also International Associa-
tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981)
("[TIhe act of state doctrine remains available . . . regardless of any
commercial component of the activity involved."), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163, 102 S.Ct. 1036, 71 L.Ed.2d 319 (1982).
The actions of Costa Rica as a sovereign nation that prevented the
timely payment of appellees' obligations are consistent with our law
and policy. Comity considerations demand that the actions of Costa
Rica be recognized in the courts of the United States. Therefore, the
action was properly dismissed.
Affirmed.
